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Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners

Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners
Date

Code

User

11/1/2007

NCOC

PHILLIPS

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

PHILLIPS

Plaintiff: Hawkins, Stan Notice Of Appearance
Dale W. Storer

Jon J. Shindurling

PHILLIPS

Filing: R2 - Appeals And Transfers For Judicial
Review To The District Court Paid by: Storer,
Dale W. (attorney for Hawkins, Stan) Receipt
number: 0047131 Dated: 11/1/2007 Amount:
$78.00 (Check) For: Hawkins, Stan (plaintiff)

Jon J. Shindurling

PHILLIPS

Petition for Judicial Review

Jon J. Shindurling

11/14/2007

DOOLITTL

Statement of Issues on Judicial Review

Jon J. Shindurling

6/4/2008

DOOLITTL

Request for Scheduling Order

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
07/28/200809:15 AM)

Jon J. Shindurling

ORDR

KER

Scheduling Order for Record/Transcript and
Notice of Hearing

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

****COPIES FOR TRANSCRIPTS BY T&T
REPORTING*******

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

GWALTERS

Defendant: Bonneville County Board Of
Commissioners Notice Of Appearance Blake G.
Hall

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

GWALTERS

Other party: Meyer, Dale W. Notice Of
Appearance Kipp L. Manwaring

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

GWALTERS

Other party: Meyer, Marla L. Notice Of
Appearance Kipp L. Manwaring

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry on Status Conference held on
Jon J. Shindurling
7/28/08 at 9: 15 AM. Opening brief is due 9/12/08,
response is due 10/10/08, reply brief is due
10/24/08.

8/8/2008

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
Jon J. Shindurling
07/28/200809:15 AM: District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

9/1512008

BRIF

DOOLITTL

Petitioner's Brief Filed

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Respondent Bonneville County Board of
Commissioner's Response Brief

Jon J. Shindurling

PETN

6/25/2008

7/9/2008
7/29/2008

10/10/2008

Judge

11/3/2008

BRIF

WILLIAMS

Petitioner's Reply Brief

Jon J. Shindurling

11/10/2008

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/01/2008 11 :30
AM) Oral Argument on Petition

Jon J. Shindurling

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearing - Oral Argument on Petition
set for 12/1/08 at 11 :30 AM

Jon J. Shindurling
Jon J. Shinduriing

12/1/2008

HRHD

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/01/2008
11:30AM: Hearing Held Oral Argument on
Petition

12/4/2008

MINE

QUINTANA

Minute Entry re Ptn review held on 12/1/08: This Jon J. Shindurling
matter is taken under advisement and opinion will
issue. (see doc for details).
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Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners

Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners
Date

Code

User

2/2/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioners'
Jon J. Shindurling
Petition for Judicial Review: The Petition for
Judicial Review of the Board's and Commission's
decisions is DISMISSED. (see doc for details)

CDIS

GWALTERS

Civil Disposition entered for: Bonneville County
Board Of Commissioners, Defendant; Meyer,
Dale W., Other Party; Meyer, Marla L., Other
Party; Hawkins, Stan, Plaintiff. Filing date:
2/2/2009

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

GWALTERS

Case Status Changed: Closed

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/09/2009 10:30
AM) Mtn to Reconsider - Hopkin to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

GWALTERS

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Hearing - 3/9/09 @ 10:30 a.m.

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

WOOLF

Notice Of Hearing 3/09/2009 @ 10:30 AM

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall in Support of
Respondent Bonneville County board of
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

WOOLF

Memorandum in Support of Respondent
Bonneville County Board of Commissioner's
Motion for Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

WOOLF

Respondent Bonneville County Board of
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

WILLIAMS

Petitioner's Objection to Bonneville County's
Costs Memorandum

Jon J. Shindurling

2/5/2009

2/10/2009

2/18/2009
2/27/2009

MOTN

WOOLF

Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling
Reconsideration

3/4/2009

RESP

DOOLITTL

Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objection Jon J. Shindurling
to Motion for Reconsideration

3/9/2009

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/09/2009
Jon J. Shindurling
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Reconsider - Hopkin
to ntc; Mtn for atty fees - Anderson Hall to ntc

3/11/2009

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 3/9/09 at 10:30
AM: Ct will issue a ruling after reviewing the
briefs. (see doc for details).

Jon J. Shindurling

6/1/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Opinion, Decision & Order on Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration: Petitioners' motion is
DENIED (see doc for details).

Jon J. Shindurling

6/16/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/14/2009 11 :00
AM) Mtn for atty fees - Angell to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

6/23/2009

NOTH

DOOLITIL

Notice Of Hearing

Jon J. Shindurling

7-14-09 @ 11:00 a.m.
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Case: CV-2007-0006123 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling
Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners

Stan Hawkins vs. Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners
Date

Code

Respondent Bonneville County Board of
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Blake G. Hallin Support of
Respondent Bonneville County Board of
Commissioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

KESTER

Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling
Attorney's Fees

KESTER

Reply Brief in Support of Respondent Bonneville
County Board of Commissioner's Motion for
Attorney's Fees

KESTER

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shindurling
Supreme Court Paid by: Storer, Dale W.
(attorney for Hawkins, Stan) Receipt number:
0032415 Dated: 7/20/2009 Amount: $101.00
(Check) For: Hawkins, Stan (plaintiff)

NOTC

KESTER

Notice of Appeal

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 7/14/2009 Time: 11 :05 am
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 07/14/2009
11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 50 Mtn for atty fees - Angell to
ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

BNDC

SHULTS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 32435 Dated

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

6/30/2009

7/14/2009

7/20/2009

Judge

DOOLITTL

6/23/2009

7/10/2009

User

BRIF

Jon J. Shindurling

7/20/2009 for 100.00)Deposit for clerk's record on

Appeal.
MCGARY

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Jon J. Shindurling

SHULTS

S.C. Acknowledgment of Clerk's Certificate of
Appeal.

Jon J. Shindurling

SHULTS

S.C. notice of Appeal filed due Date 10-6-09
Docket # 36742

Jon J. Shindurling

ORDR

GWALTERS

Opinion, Decision and Order on Respondent's
Jon J. Shindurling
Mtn for Atty Fees: Respondent's Mtn for Atty Fees
is DENIED. (see doc for details).

TRAN

MCGARY

Transcript Filed (3-9-09 hearing)

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

MCGARY

(copy) Motion to Use Digital Clerk's Record

Jon J. Shindurling

SHULTS

S.C. the following documents were filed with S. C. Jon J. Shindurling
(Respondent's Motin to Use Digital Clerk's
Record (CD Attatched).

SHULTS

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Use Digital
Clerk's Record.

MISC
8/6/2009

8/31/2009

9/29/2009
10/5/2009

11/17/2009

NOTC

03

Jon J. Shindurling

ASSIGNED TO
JUDGE JON J. SHINDURLlNG

Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Petitioner, Stan Hawkins
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
INRE:
Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.
STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,

v.
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

Case No.

cV01J- (('{;)~?

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Fee Category: R.2
Fee: $72.00

Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial Review
pursuant to the provisions ofIdaho Code §§ 67-5270 and 67-6521 and Rule 84 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of such Petition, Petitioner alleges as follows:
1.

Petitioner is an individual, residing in Bonneville County, Idaho.

2.

Respondent, the Bonneville County Board of County Commissioners (the

"Board"), is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho.
3.

Venue of this Petition is proper under the provisions ofIdaho Code § 67-

4.

On or about January 16,2007, Applicants filed an "Application for

5272.

Variance to Validate the Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling on Parcels Without
the Required 100' of Road Frontage" with the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning
Commission (the "Commission"). The Application sought a determination from the
Commission that the Applicants were entitled to continue a non-confonning residential
use of Applicants' property without the required one hundred (100) feet of frontage under
the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance. In partiCUlar, the Applicants sought to confirm
their right to resume use of an existing farm access road across Petitioner's property for
the purpose of using two abandoned dwelling houses.
5.

The application was heard by the Commission on March 1, 2007, at the

conclusion of which the Commission granted the Application. On March 8, 2007,
Petitioner filed aN otice of Appeal to the Board of County Commissioners of Bonneville
County (the "Board") pursuant to § 1-5-15 of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance.

2
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PETITION FOR JUDlCIAL REVIEW

6.

On May 23,2007, the Commission issued a "Report of Findings and

Decision", in it it found that the use was "grand fathered in" and did not need a variance.
7.

On June 19,2007, Petitioner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal pursuant

to § 1-5-13 of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance appealing from such written
"RepOli of Findings and Decision".
8.

Pettitioners' appeal was heard by the Board on September 6, 2007, and the

Board thereafter issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision dated October 5,
2007, upholding the decision of the Commission.
9.

The proceedings before the Commission and the Board were recorded

magnetically and a copy ofthe tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the
Bonneville County Board of County Commissioners.
10.

Petitioner will file a statement of the issues for Judicial Review within

fOUlieen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Petition.
11.

A transcript of the proceedings before the Commission and before the

Board is requested. Petitioner further requests that the Clerks of the Commission and the
Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, exhibits and other documents
filed in conjunction with the above-referenced proceedings.
12.

Petitioner further requests that he be awarded his reasonable attorneys fees

and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows:
1.

3

-

For judicial review of the Board's and Commission's decisions in this

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

n

matter, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6521.
2.

For an order reversing the decision of the Board dated October 5, 2007, and

remanding the matter to the Board for reconsideration consistent with the Court's
direction.
3.

For an order awarding Petitioner his reasonable attorneys fees and costs

pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.c. § 1988.
4.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this

.s+
I

day of November, 2007.

Dale W. Storer,
Attorney for the Petitioner

4
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PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that I am a duly licens~d attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of
and with my office in Idaho Falls, and that:
1.

That service of this Petition has been made upon the Bonneville County

Planning and Zoning Commission and the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners,
and or their agents and attorneys, as follows:
a.

( v) Mail

Blake O. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630

(
(

) Hand Delivery
) Facsimile

b.

Ronald Longmore
Bonneville County Clerk
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

( 0Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

c.

Steven Serr
Building & Zoning Administrator
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

( v1Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

d.

Kipp L. Manwaring
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271

(/) Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

2.

That the clerk of Bonneville County has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the transcripts requested above.
3.

That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the

preparation of the agency record.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
G \WPDATA\D\VS\ 14109 Stan Hawkins (Variance)\Pctitioll for Judicial Review.wpd:smm
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o

Dale W. Storer. Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
l-IOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Petitioner, Stan Hawkins
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
IN RE:
Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling
on Parcels Without the Required 100' of
Road Frontage.

Case No. CV-07-6123

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v.

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife.
Applicants.

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following Statement
ofIssues for Judicial Review, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 84(d) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The issues for which Petitioner will seek Judicial Review include, without
limitation, the following:
a.

Did the Board violate the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho
Code when it made a finding that the "spur" road was a public road,
without giving notice and conducting a separate hearing as required
by such chapter?

b.

Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights in finding the
"spur" road to be a public road, without providing notice of its intent
to consider evidence regarding the existence or non-existence of such
public road?

c.

Did the Board err in determining that the variance should be
approved, based upon its finding that the "spur road" was a public
road?

d.

Did the Board and the Planning and Zoning Commission err in
applying an "intent to abandon" standard in determining that the
Applicants had not discontinued use of the two old ranch houses,
under § 1-203, Bonneville County Code?

e.

2

-

Did the Board err in failing to apply or follow the definition of

STA TEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

10

"street" under § 1-106(77) of the Bonneville County Code, when it
determined that the Bone frontage road was a public road, the
abandonment of which constituted a "special circumstance" justifying
approval of the variance.

f.

Did the Board err in finding that a taking would occur if it enforced
the non-conforming use provisions of the Bonneville County Code?

g.

Did the Board have lawful authority to waive the provisions of § 1707 of the Bonneville County Code, by granting a "variance" under
Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act and the Bonneville County
Zoning Ordinance?

h.

Did the Board err as a matter of law in placing the burden of proof
upon the Petitioner to prove the subject two roads (the frontage road
and the spur road) were never "formally abandoned?" See

Homestead Farms v. Teton County, 141 Idaho 855,119 P.3d 630 (S.
Ct. 2005)
1.

Did the Board err in adopting the finding of the Commission that two
new, larger residential structures should be allowed, notwithstanding

§§ 1-201 and 1-202 of the Bonneville County Code?
J.

Did the Board err in adopting the finding of the Commission that the
County's adoption of § 1-707 of the Code created a "special
circumstance" justifying the issuance of a variance and that the facts

3

~.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

11

supported the granting of a variance under § 1-511 of the Bonneville
County Code?
DATED this

{f~ day of November, 2007.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c.

4-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of
and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing
or by facsimile, as indicated below, with the correct postage thereon, on this

{if~ay of

November, 2007.

DOCU.MENT SERVED:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

ATTORNEY SERVED:
Kipp L Manwaring
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-027 I

( AMail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box

Blake G. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630

( .___) Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box

Steven Serr
Bonneville County Planning and Zoning
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(
(
(

(~)

Mail
) Hand Delivery
) Facsimile
) Courthouse Box

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE·

IN RE:

)
)

Application for a Variance to Validate
the Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.

)
)
)
)
)

STAN HAWKINS,

Case No. CV-2007-6123

SCHEDULING ORDER FOR
RECORD/TRANSCRIPT AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)

Petitioner,
-vs-

)
)
)
)

B01\;rNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)

-vs-

)
)

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,

)
)
)

Applicants.

)
)

Whereas, the Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order was filed November
14, 2007, and
Whereas, Rule 84(j)(1), LR.C.P., provides that judicial review of agency actions shall be
based upon the record created before the agency, and
Whereas, Rule 840)(2), LR.C.P., provides that a transcript shall be prepared as provided
in Rule 84(k), LR.C,P" and
Page - I

Whereas, Rule 84(k)(1 )(A) provides that the petitioner shall pay the estimated fee for
preparation of the transcript as determined by the transcriber within fourteen (14) days after filing
the petition for judicial review, and
Whereas, Rule 84(k)(1)(B), I.R.C.P., provides that upon payment of the estimated
transcript fees, the transcriber shall prepare the transcript and lodge it with the agency within
fourteen (14) days from the date of the payment of the estimated fee, and
Whereas, Rule 84(0), I.R.C.P., provides that upon receipt of the transcript, the agency
shall mail notice of lodging to the district court, and
Whereas, the above named case will be brought before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling,
District Judge, on the

day

-""-'-.:::--'+\-'

2008, at the hour of ~: _~.m. to report on the

status of this action and to schedule further proceedings.
Whereas, the time within which a transcript should be prepared has expired;
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given pursuant to Rule 84(s), I.R.C.P., that failure to
prepare and lodge a transcript with the proper agency within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
order shall result in dismissal of the Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order.
DATED this

~ay of June, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day oDune, 2008, I did send a true and correct corY of the
foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing with the correct postage thereon; by causing
the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing the same to be han<lllelivered.
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL & SMITH
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630
/

[vJ Courthouse Box

[ ] U.S. Mail

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Fax

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Fax

[ J Hand Delivered

[ J Fax

[ ] Hand Delivered

[ ] Fax

] Hand Delivered

[ ] Fax

Ronald Longmore
Bonneville County Clerk
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 NOl1h Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
[v(COUl1house Box

[ ] U.S. Mail

Steven Serr
Building & Zoning Administrator
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

[ J COUl1house Box

[v{u.S. Mail

Kipp L. Manwaring, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, 1D 83405-0271

[ J Courthouse Box

[\,(u.S. Mail

Dale W. Storer, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

/
[\fCourthouse Box

[ ] U.S. Mail

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
/'\I~

By

! "~

Deputjy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF,
COMMISSIONERS
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123
MINUTE ENTRY ON
STATUS CONFERENCE

)

On July 28, 2008, at 9: 15 A.M., a status conference came on for hearing before the
Honorable Jon 1. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in chambers at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, was present.
Mr. Dale Storer was present on behalf of the plaintiff.
Mr. Blake Hall was present on behalf of the defendant.
Mr. Kipp Manwaring was present on behalf of the Meyers.
After a brief discussion, the Court set a briefing schedule for the parties. The opening
brief is due by September 12, 2008, the response brief due by October 10, 2008, and the reply
brief due on October 24,2008.
The conference was thus adjourned.

c: Dale Storer
Blake Hall
Kipp Manwaring

MINUTE ENTRY - I

1

Dale W. Storer
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P. O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Idaho State Bar No. 2166

8aN!~EVILL£ CDU~ .
IDAHO TO
IS Pf'1 4: ? R
t_

Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

INRE:

Case No. CV-07-6123

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100 9 of Road Frontage.
STAN HA WKINS,
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,
v.
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

,~

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following
Memorandum Brief in support of his Petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Rule 84 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure"
NATURE OF CASE
Petitioner Stan Hawkins ("Hawkins") seeks judicial review of a decision by the
Bonneville County Board of Commissioners granting a variance allowing Dale and Marla
Meyer ("Meyers" or "Applicants") to demolish and replace two (2) dilapidated ranch
houses with two (2) new, larger residential structures. The variance was necessary
because the parcels on which the old ranch houses sit do not have the one hundred (l00)
feet of road frontage which the Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance now
requires of parcels used for residential purposes. The variance allows the Meyers to
replace their existing ranch houses "without placement or size limitations!9 The variance
was also granted notwithstanding that Meyers have not used the ranch houses for nearly
ten (10) years and despite the fact that the County zoning ordinance states that "any
nonconforming use which is discontinued for one (1) year or more shall thereafter be in
conformance with all the provisions of the zoning ordinance." The new structures, if
allowed, will derive access to the County road across an existing, single lane farm access
easement which traverses the Petitioner's property.l
STATEMENT OF CASE
On or about January 16,2007, Applicants filed an "Application for Variance" (the

IThis lane was variously referrd to as the "spur road" in the proceedings before the Board of County Commissioners.
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"Application"). Comm. R. p.l? The purpose ofthe variance, as noted by the Planning and
Zoning Commission (the "Commission"), was to "validate the right to replace a house on
parcels without the 100' frontage on an approved road." Comm. R.175. The Application
sought a determination from the Commission that the Applicants were entitled to resume
the nonconforming residential use of the two ranch houses without the one hundred (l00)
feet of frontage on a County road which is required under the Bonneville County Building
and Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "BCBZO,,).3 The Commission heard the
Application on March 1,2007, and at the conclusion of the hearing the Commission
verbally granted the Application. Comm. Tr. p.134, L.1O through p.l3S, L.4.
On March 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Board of County
Commissioners of Bonneville County (the "Board") pursuant to BCBZO, § 1-513.
Comm. R.p.185. Following the filing of the Petitioner's Notice of Appeal, the
Commission issued a "Report of Findings and Decision," in which it granted the variance
for the construction of "new residences on these tracts ofland." Comm. R.p.l75-79. On
June 19,2007, Petitioner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal from the Commission's
written findings pursuant to BCBZO § 1-513. Board R.p.73. The Board heard
Petitioners' appeal de novo on September 6,2007, and the Board thereafter issued its

2Because the official record filed with the Court was not paginated, Petitioner has, for the Court's convenience,
attached a CD-ROM containing "Bates-stamped" copies of the agency record before the Planning and Zoning Commission and
the agency record before the Board of County Commissioners. A copy of the record created at the Planning and Zoning hearing
before Commission is included on the CD-ROM as "Appendix A," and is cited herein as "Comm. R. _ " A copy of the record
created at the hearing before Board of County Commissioners is also contained on the CD-ROM as "Appendix B," and is cited
herein as "Board R.
"
3A

copy of the Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance is contained in the attached CD-ROM as Appendix

"C."
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision dated October 5, 2007. In that decision, the
Board adopted the Commission's findings and upheld the earlier decision of the
Commission to grant the variance. Board R.p.l35. On October 26,2007, Petitioner filed
the instant Petition for Judicial Review with this Court.
At the Planning and Zoning level, the Commission found that there was no
enlargement of the land (as contrasted with the enlargement of the foot print of the two
ranch houses) devoted to the non-conforming use. 4 Comm. R.p.177. Thus, the
Commission concluded that the Meyers' Application to resume their non-conforming use
did not violate BCBZO § 1-202, notwithstanding specific language of that section which
provides that "no permit shall be issued which shall have the effect of increasing the floor
space devoted to the nonconforming use .., ," Comm. R.p.177. The Commission also
held that the very fact that the property was nonconforming, required frontage on a County road, -

i.e. because it lacked the

was a "special circumstance" justifYing the

granting of the variance. Comm. R.p.178. Finally, although the Commission expressly
granted the variance to replace the old ranch houses with newer structures, it also held
that the variance was unnecessary because the Applicants' parcels, had a "grandfathered"
right to continue. Comm. R.p.178.
In its October 5, 2007 Decision, the Board of County Commissioners adopted the
findings of the Planning and Zoning Commission by reference and approved the
Commission's decision. Board R. pp.l35 through 137. The Board's decision also held

4Meyers sought not only pennission to enlarge the size of the existing ranch houses, but also to move them to a
different location.
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1.

that it would be a "taking" to deny the Applicants the right to construct two (2) entirely
new residential structures. Board R. p.136-37. Further, the Board concluded that the
IY1eyers were entitled to construct new recreational homes under the nonconforming use
provisions of BCBZO, § 1-203, on the basis that there was "no intent by the :Meyers to

abandon the residential uses of these parcels." Board R. p.137. Such decision was made
notwithstanding the provision of § 1-203 of the BCBZO which provides that the right to
maintain a nonconforming use is lost when the use "is discontinued for a period of one
(1) year or more." (emphasis added)
The Board also held that the variance was unnecessary based on "new evidence"
that a separate "spur road" leading to the old ranch houses and traversing Petitioner's
land, was a County road. 5 Board R.p.13 7. The most significant consequence of this
finding is that both of the Meyers' parcels would now have the required frontage if the
spur road was a lawful County Road. 6 This finding was made even through the spur road
was admittedly not shown on the current County road map and notwithstanding the
County Road Supervisor's admission that the County was "working to have it formally
adopted by the County." Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, L. 7. Further, the Meyers
submitted no evidence of prescriptive use of the spur road for the required five year

5Several different roads were at issue in the proceedings below: the Bone Road which was an existing county road; a
"spur road." and a "frontage road.". Only Bone Road is a County road as indicated by the approved County map. Board Tr. p.94.
L.22 through p.95, L.7. The "spur road," also called the "farm access road," is essentially a dirt lane which heads nearly due west
from the Bone Road, crosses the Hawkins' property and then continues west to the Meyers' property. Board R.p.94. The
"frontage road" was a graveled driveway formerly in existence that provided access from Bone Road to the old Bone store, which
burned down in the mid 1940's. Board Tf. p.43 LL.2 - 11.
6The Board's findings are internally inconsistent. On the one hand, their finding that the spur road was a county road
necessarily holds that the parcels have the required frontage on a county road. On the other hand, the Board expressly adopted
the findings of the Commission. Board R.p.135. The Commission had specifically found that "[t]hese tracts ofland have no
frontage on a currently maintained county road." Comm. R.p.l77.
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period. Rather, the Board apparently relied solely upon a 1961 State ofIdaho road map.
Board Tr. p. 93, LL 16-20. Despite absence of the spur road from the County Road Map
and despite the lack of any evidence showing prescriptive use, the Board simply assumed
that the spur road was an approved county road and then placed the burden on Petitioner
to show "abandonment" of the road. Petitioner was never given any notice that the status
of the spur road would be an issue at the hearing before the Board. Board R.p.137. In the
end, the Board concluded that the "request for variance [should] be approved for the
replacement of the two homes without placement or size limitations." Board R.p.l37.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Board err in evaluating Applicants' nonconforming use under an

"intent to abandon" rather than a "discontinuance" standard?
2.

Did the Board have jurisdiction to declare the existence of a County road,

outside the context of a statutory validation proceeding under Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho
Code?
3.

Did the Board violate the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, ofthe Idaho

Code by finding that the frontage road and spur road were public roads, without
complying with the required statutory notice and hearing provisions?
4.

Did the Board err as a matter of law by placing the burden on Petitioner to

prove the spur road was "formally abandoned?"
5.

Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights by declaring the

existence of a County road across Petitioner's property without affording Petitioner notice

6 -
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of its intent to conduct a validation hearing?
6.

Did the Board err in finding that a "taking" of the Applicants' property

would occur absent its granting a variance?
7.

Did the Board err in adopting the Commission's finding that the lack of

frontage on a County road constituted a "special circumstance" justifying the granting of
the variance?
8.

Did the Board have authority, under the non-conforming use provisions of

the County Zoning Ordinance to allow Meyers construction of entirely new structures
"without placement or size limitations?"
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, owns a large dry farm, a portion of which fronts upon
the County road adjacent to the Bone Store in Bonneville County, Idaho. Mr. Hawkins
purchased the property relevant to this case in 1998. Board Tr. p.37, L.15-17.7 Mr.
Hawkins' property is located on the west side of Bone Road, immediately south of the
present Bone Store. Board R.p.94. The Meyer's dry farm is located further to the west of
the Hawkins' parcel and is separated from the Bone Road by Hawkins' parcel. Board
R.p.94. Access to the Meyers parcel is derived via a single lane farm access road which
traverses Hawkins' property for a distance of approximately eighty (80) feet. Comm. Tr.
p.31,1.14-19. Currently, there are two dilapidated, nonfunctional ranch houses on the
Applicants' property which are accessed via the farm access lane that runs across
7The transcript of the February 28,2007, hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission is cited herein as
"Comm. Tr." The transcript of the September 6, 2007, hearing before the Board of County Commissioners is cited herein as
"Board Tr."
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Petitioner's property. Neither ranch house is now used for residential purposes. One of
the houses has not seen use since 2001, (Comm. Tr. p.6, L.17 -19), the other has not been
lived in for "probably 10 years or more," Comm. Tr. p26, L.16-17. This farm access
road leads to two (2) old ranch houses, one referred to as the "Max Rockwood House"
and the other referred to as the "Jefson House". See Comm. Tr. p.6, L.6-21 and Comm.
Tr. p.lS, L.2-5. The Rockwood House was apparently built in 1936. Comm. TL p.6, L.621. The other horne was built by Mangus Jefson between 1910 and 1912. Cornrn. Tr.
p.IS, L,2-S. In the mid-1990's, the Meyers' daughter and son-in-law moved the Jefson
House from its old rock foundation and attempted to remodel the house. Cornrn. Tr. p.18,
L.16-21. Subsequently, the Meyers decided that the effort to remodel the old ranch house
was not cost effective and therefore abandoned the remodeling effort. Comm. Tr. p20,
1.17-19. No one has lived in the Jefson House for "probably 10 years or more." Cornm.
Tr. p.25, 1.16-17. The Rockwood House has been uninhabited since 200L Cornrn. Tr.

p.6, LI7-19.
Neither horne is in currently in a habitable condition. Mrs. Meyer described the
properties as being in "obsolescence (sic) and poor condition." Cornrn. Tr. p.23, L.19.
They are both "run-down" and "very dilapidated." Board Tr. p.55, L.19 through p.57,
L.21. Though power is available in the vicinity of the properties, neither structure is
currently connected to or using electricity. Cornrn. Tr. p.23, L23-24 and p.48, L.3-14. In
1999, an appraiser from the Bonneville County Assessor's Office, Leann Christensen,
determined that the Jefson House "was no longer a liveable horne." Cornrn. Tf. p.28,

8

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

1.20-22. After that point the Meyers no longer paid property taxes on the home. Comm.
Tro po2S, L.6-7.

At the hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission, Mrs. Meyer admitted
that the Max Rockwood property "never did" have "County Road frontage."s Comm. Tr.
p. 6,1. 5; p.27, L.21-25. Mrs. Meyer alleged that the Jefson House "did have a little
frontage" at one time, but conceded that it does not currently have frontage on a county
road. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.5-7 and Comm Tr. p.16, 1.12. However, at both the Commission
hearing and the Board hearing, there was conflicting evidence about whether the Jefson
parcel ever had frontage on a County road. The dispute focused upon whether the
frontage road that was formerly used as an access road from the Bone Road to the old
Bone Store, was at one time a County road. Board Tr. pAl, 1.11 through p.46, L.IS; see

also map at Board R.p.97. Specifically, the dispute raised the question of whether the
frontage road formerly serving the Bone store had ever been dedicated as a County road
and whether the County's alleged relocation of the frontage road was a "special
circumstance" authorizing the issuance of a variance. Specifically, Meyers contended
that the Jefson parcel had at one time abutted the frontage road and that the frontage road
was, at one time, a County-approved road. Comm. Tr. p.21, L.15-19. Further, Meyers
contended that the Jefson property lost its frontage because the County purportedly
moved the frontage road "approximately SO feet to the east where it is presently located."
Comm. Tr. p.21, L.22-24.
8Despite Mrs. Meyers' admission before the Planning and Zoning Commission, counsel for the Meyers asserted at the
appeal before the Board of County Commissioners - for the first time - that the Rockwood home did have frontage based on the
unsupported theory that the farm access road, or "spur road," was a county road. Board Tr. p.76. L.3-6.
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On the other hand, Mr. Hawkins contended that the frontage road serving the old
Bone store had never in fact been dedicated or used as a County road. Rather, he argued
that the former frontage road was merely a graveled driveway used out of necessity to
provide access from the Bone Road to former location of the original Bone Store and that
when the old Bone store was destroyed by fire in the 1940s and the building subsequently
relocated closer to the main Bone Road, the access provided by the frontage road was no
longer necessary and that the road was then abandoned. Board Tr. pAl, L.Il through
pA6, LIB. Mr. Hawkins bolstered his argument by introducing evidence of a judicial

finding made in 1979 that the property upon which the frontage road was located, had, as
of 1979, "been [privately] possessed, farmed, and fenced ... for a period in excess of 30
years." Board Tr. pAS, L.lO-lS. In sum, Mr. Hawkins argued that the discontinued use of
the frontage road did not change the fact that the lefson property, like the Rockwood
property, never had frontage on an approved County road and as such the Meyers
contention that the "relocation" of the frontage road was a "special circumstance" which
justified a variance, was without any merit. Board Tr. p.33, L23 through p.34, L5.
At the Board hearing, the Meyers argued - for the first time - that the farm access
road 9 across Hawkins' grain field was also a County road and thus provided the Meyers'
parcels with the necessary one hundred (l00) feet of frontage, such that a variance was
not in fact necessary. Board Tr. p.81, L.16-17. This argument was based on a 1961 State
of Idaho Transportation Department road inventory map that apparently showed the spur

9This
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road. Board Tr. p.93, L.16-20. Nevertheless, the County Road Supervisor, Mr. Kevin
Eckersell, acknowledged that this spur road, as shown on the 1961 State of Idaho map,
was not listed on the current Bonneville County Road Map and that the County was
allegedly "working on" having it declared to be a County road. Board Tr. p.95, L.4-7.
No proof was submitted to the Board that the frontage road or the spur road was
ever the subject of the validation proceedings or that either the Bone Store frontage road
or the spur road had ever been included on a County Map as required under Title 20,
Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code. Further, no evidence was submitted of the County's
prescriptive use of either road for the required five (5) year period. Instead of requiring
evidence of the necessary validation proceedings and of the existence of both roads on the
official County Road Map, the Board simply assumed both roads were public roads. As
the Board's findings show, after assuming public status of both roads, the Board then
placed the burden on Mr. Hawkins to show that the roads were abandoned. Board
R.p.137. The Board placed this burden on Mr. Hawkins despite the fact that Mr.
Hawkins had no notice that the status of the spur road would be an issue at the hearing.
The notice published by the County expressly stated that purpose of the hearing was
discussion of "a variance to validate the right to replace the a single family dwelling on
each ofthe described parcels without the required 100' ofroad frontage." Board R.p.2
(emphasis added). At the Board hearing Mr. Hawkins strenuously objected to the
manifest unfairness of having to prove the abandonment of a road when he had no notice
that the spur road's status would be at issue. Board Tr. p.95, L.24 through p.IOO, L.4.
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Although the Board's notice indicated that the hearing would be to discuss a variance, the
Board considered the status of the spur road at the variance hearing and then concluded,
despite a lack of notice or evidence, that the frontage road and the spur road were County
roads. Board R.p.137.

ARGUMENT

I.
The Board Erred in Evaluating Applicants? Nonconforming Use Under an
"Intent to Abandon H Rather Than a "Discontinuance" Standard.
Under the BCZBO, non-conforming uses are permitted but the ordinance includes
provisions that provide for gradual elimination of the non-conforming use.
Nonconforming uses which were in existence at the time the ordinance was adopted "may
be continued to the same extent and character as that which existed on the effective date
of this ordinance." BCBZO § 1-201. (Emphasis added). However, the Ordinance
specifically states that "[i]f a nonconforming use of land or use of a building ... is
discontinued for one (1) year or more, any further use of said building or land ... shall
thereafter be in conformity with the provisions of this ordinance." BCZBO § 1-203
(emphasis added). The drafters of the ordinance could have expressly required that a
nonconforming use be abandoned, but for sound policy reasons associated with the
difficulty of proving subjective intent, the drafters of the ordinance obviously chose a
discontinuance standard. The plain language of the ordinance indicates that simple
discontinuance, not intent to abandon, is the condition triggering the termination of the
right to continue a nonconforming use.
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The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same principles in construing municipal or
county ordinances as are used in the construction of state statutes. Spencer v. Kootenai

County, 145 Idaho 445, 180 P.3d 487,495 (2008). The Court explained that process as
follows:
The objective in interpreting a statue or ordinance is to derive
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act ... [and]
[s ]uch analysis begins with the literal language of the
enactment. Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect,
and there is no occasionfor a court to consider the rules of
statutory construction

ld. (emphasis added and citations omitted). The language of the zoning ordinance at issue
here is unambiguous. It clearly calls for nonconforming uses to be subject to a
discontinuance standard, not an intent to abandon standard. Thus, the Board erred in
imposing the more stringent standard, which would require proof of sUbjective intent,
rather than mere discontinuance for a specified period of time.
In a Wisconsin case interpreting an ordinance with a discontinuance provision
similar to Bonneville County's, the court held that "[t]o apply the 'discontinuance'
provisions, proof of intent to abandon the nonconforming use is not required ... Under
the terms of the ordinance, if a nonconforming use has been discontinued for more than
twelve months, proof of intent to abandon the nonconforming use is not required."

Lessard v. Burnett County Bd. ofAdjustment, 256 Wis.2d 821, 837,649 N.W.2d 728, 736
(\Vis.App. 2002).
The public interest and ability to enforce provisions encouraging the gradual
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elimination of non-conforming uses are best served by a "discontinuance," rather than an
"intent to abandon" standard. Idaho courts have long held that the purpose of nonconforming use provisions are "the gradual elimination of non-conforming uses within
the zoned area .... " O'Connor v. City ofMoscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42, 202 P.2d 401,404
(1949). And while due process requires that nonconforming uses cannot be immediately
terminated simply by passing a zoning ordinance, "eventually the non-conforming use is
to be eliminated." Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City a/Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 561
n.3 ,468 P.2d 290,293 (1970). Idaho courts have further stated that public policy
"dictates the firm regulation of nonconforming use with a view to their eventual
elimination," and that "nonconforming uses have no inherent right to be extended or
enlarged." Bastian v. City o/Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App.
1983) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Other courts
have held that "[p ]rovisions permitting nonconforming uses to continue should be
construed strictly, and zoning provisions restricting nonconforming uses should be
construed liberally." Trailer Haven MHP, LLC v. City a/Aurora, 81 P.3d 1132, 1139
(Colo.App.2003).
Use of an "abandonment" standard wholly defeats the objective of gradually
eliminating non-conforming uses. The Colorado Supreme Court has noted that requiring
a showing of subjective intent in discontinuance ordinances "encourages property owners
to commit perjury, impedes the desirable goal of creating uniform zoning plans, and
defeats the intention of municipalities in their attempts to avoid imposing such a[ n ]
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[intent] requirement in the first placeo" Hartley v. City of Co lorado Springs, 764 P.2d
1216, 1225 (Colo. 1988). Thus,"in the absence of express language to the contrary, intent
to abandon need not be shown when a zoning ordinance specifies a reasonable time for
discontinuing a nonconforming use."10 Id.
The BCZBO was adopted in 1959. Comm. Tr. p.52, L.22 through p.53, L.23;
Board Tr. p.67, L.9-1 O. It did not immediately bar all nonconforming uses. Rather, it
allowed any nonconforming use to continue intact unless "discontinued for a period of
one (1) year or more." BCBZO § 1-203. There was no dispute that the old ranch houses
on Meyers' parcels were at one time non-conforming because "they do not have,
currently, frontage on an approved county road." Comm. Tr. p.2, L.21-22; BCBZO § 1707. At the hearing before the Board it was uncontested that both the old ranch houses
had not been used for residential purposes for a period of at least seven (7) years, and
likely more, before the Meyers applied for their building permit Board Tr. p.55, L.19
through p.60, L.24. At the February 28,2007 hearing before the Planning and Zoning
Commission, the Meyers did not present any evidence that either parcel had been used for
residential purposes after 2001. Comm. Tr., p.6, L.8-19 ("Rockwood" parcel) and p.17,
L.8 through p.18, L.21 ("Jefson" parcel) Importantly, the Meyers did not deny that use of
the parcels for residential purposes had been discontinued for a period of more than one
year; they merely stated that "we have never abandoned those properties." Board Tr. p.90,
L.5-6.

lOIn Hartley, the court found that a zoning regulation employing a one-year discontinuance period, similar to ordinance
at issue here. was reasonable. 764 P.2d at 1224.
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The unambiguous language of the BCBZO § 1-203 only requires proof that the
nonconforming use has been "discontinued for a period of one (1) year or more." Here,
the evidence is uncontested that the Meyers had discontinued the nonconforming
residential use of their properties for at least seven (7) years before filing the subject
variance applicationo In this case, the Board simply ignored the unambiguous language of
its own ordinanceo Nothing in the Ordinance suggests that subjective intent is even an
issue. As noted above, where the language of an ordinance is unambiguous, the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given affect, and there is no occasion for
a court to employ the rules of statutory constructiono The Board's use of an
"abandonment" standard was simply fabricated out of whole cloth and has no basis
whatsoever in the Ordinance. The Board's finding that the two ranch houses had not lost
their non-conforming use status as a result of the cessation of use, is clearly erroneous as
a matter of law. The Board's decision should be reversed and the Court should find as a
matter oflaw that Meyers' have no right to resume use of the old ranch houses.
II.
The Board Violated the Provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code
by Finding That the Spur Road Was a Public Road.

A.
The Board Had No Jurisdiction to Determine the Status ofthe Spur Road as
a County Road, Outside the Context of the Statutory Process Established in Title 40,
Chapter 2, Idaho Code.
As noted above, the Board held for the first time that the Meyers' application for a
variance was unnecessary based on "new evidence" that the spur road leading to the two
ranch houses and traversing Hawkins property was in fact a County road. Board R. p.
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137. Such finding obviated the need for a variance because the two old ranch houses
would now have frontage on a dedicated County road. This finding was made even
though it was undisputed that the spur road was not shown on the current County Road
Map and there was no proof of prior prescriptive use or a judicial determination of its
status as a County road. Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, LL 7. For the reasons set
forth below, Petitioner submits that the Board should have required proof of a proper
statutory validation proceeding or a judicial declaration of the spur road status as a
County road and it was improper to consolidate a statutory validation proceeding into a
variance hearing, in clear violation of the provisions of Title 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho
Code.
The Idaho Legislative has established a very specific comprehensive process for
establishing the existence of a county road. Importantly, the process requires a public
hearing before a highway map

designating "each highway and public right-of-way in

[the] jurisdiction" - can be adopted.

I.e § 40-202(l)(a). Additionally, if, after the

highway map is adopted, the county wishes to "validate" additional roads as highways or
public rights-of-way, the county must hold a public hearing on the matter and "accept
testimony from persons having an interest in the proposed validation." I.e. § 40-203A(2).
Prior to any hearing at which a County will validate the existence of a road, the Board
must provide adequate notice of the validation proceedings by formal publication. I.C. §§
40-203, 40-203A. The statute also requires that prior to any validation proceeding, the
Board must prepare a report on the proposed validation. I.C. § 40-203A(2).
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The Legislature has established a very clear and comprehensive procedure by
which a Board of County Commissioners may itself, adjudicate the status of a road as
private or pUblic. Thus, outside that carefully delineated statutory procedure, the Board
has no jurisdiction to declare a road or way to be a public road. That power would reside
exclusively in a court of law where proper due process procedures could be employed and
where, the submission of evidence is carefully circumscribed by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. There are no provisions in the validation statute allowing a county to conduct
a validation procedure within the context of a variance hearing. Outside the context of a
properly noticed and conducted validation hearing, the Board was without jurisdiction to
determine the status of the spur road in the variance proceeding at hand.

B.
Even Assuming That Consolidation of a Validation Proceeding with a
Variance Proceeding Was Proper, the Board Failed to Comply with the Statutory
Procedures in Title 40, Chapter 2 in Any Event.
Even assuming the Board had jurisdiction to consolidate a validation proceeding
with a variance hearing, the Board did not follow the statute in any event. There was no
evidence adduced, either at the Commission hearing or the Board hearing, that the
requirements of TitIe 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code had been followed, that there had
been a prior express dedication of the spur road on a county plat or a prior judicial
adjudication of the County's prior prescriptive use of the spur road lane as a county road.
Further, the County Road Supervisor admitted that the spur road was not listed as a
County road on the current County road map. Board Tr. p. 94, LL 20 through p. 95, LL 7.
Unlike the Meyers, Mr. Hawkins did produce evidence of a prior adjudication of the
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private nature of the parcel on which the farm access lane or spur road was located.
Specifically, Mr. Hawkins introduced evidence of a judicial finding that, as of 1979, the
ground over which the frontage and the spur roads were located had been "possessed~
farmed, and fenced", by Bryant N. Rockwood, Hawkins' predecessor, "for a period in
excess of30 years." Board Tr. p.53, L.IO-I5, Comm. R. pp. 41-48. 11 Such time frame
certainly embraced the period preceding the 1961 State of Idaho map.
At the September 6,2007, hearing before the Board, the Meyers contended - for
the first time - that the spur road was a County road. Board Tr. p.76, L.3-6. Based on that
assertion, the Meyers contended that "[w]e don't even need a variance." Board Tr. p.77,
L.6-7. The Board, apparently accepting the Meyers' claim at face value, concluded that
"the spur road which runs to the west of from [sic] Bone Road also existed." Board
Kp.13 7. Despite this finding, there is no evidence in the record that the County ever
prepared a report concerning the spur road's status as a County road or conducted the
necessary validation proceedings. Further, the notice of the hearing before the Board 12
explicitly stated that the hearing would be "in relation to the appeal by Stan Hawkins to
the Board of Adjustment approval of the application of Dale & Marla Meyer for a
Variance to validate the right to replace a single family dwelling on each of the described
parcels without the required 100' ofroad frontage. " Board R.p.2 (emphasis added). Thus,

IIThis judicial decision is erroneously included as part of the Commission record. It should have been part of the
Board record, because it was only used during the Board hearing.
12The notice initially indicated the hearing would be on August 7, 2007. However, by agreement of the parties the
hearing was continued until September 6,2007.
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the plain language of the notice gives no indication that the Board would be considering
the status of the spur road as a County road and necessarily assumes that the Meyers'
parcels lacked the necessary road frontage. Clearly Hawkins had no notice that the
County intended to conduct a validation proceeding as part of the variance hearing. See

I.e. § 40-203, 40-203(A).
As a consequence of the Board's hasty conclusion regarding the status of the spur
road, Petitioner had no opportunity to present evidence and the Board based its
conclusion on a one-sided presentation. The Board's failure to prepare a report and the
lack of proper notice clearly violated the provisions ofLC. § 40-203A. In the absence of
compliance with those statutory procedures, the Board should have limited its
consideration of whether a prior statutory validation had been conducted, whether there
was a prior judicial declaration or whether there was evidence of an express dedication,
either by plat or deed. The Board's decision should be reversed and the matter remanded,
with instructions to so limit its deliberations.

III.
The Board Erred as a Matter of Law by Placing the Burden on Petitioner to
Prove That the Spur Road and Frontage Road Were "Formally Abandoned."
As noted above, Meyers presented absolutely no evidence that the County had
formally validated the spur road as required by Title 40. Nor was there any evidence that
the spur road had been acquired by prescription through County maintenance and upkeep
for a period of five (5) years. J3 See LC. § 40-202(3). Nor was there any evidence of a
13As noted above, outside the context of a proper statutory validation proceeding, the Board had no jurisdiction to
"validate" the spur road as a County road. The argument set forth below assumes arguendo that such jurisdiction did exist, but
argues that the County's reliance upon the 1961 State ofIdaho map was improper in any event.
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prior judicial determination of the status of the spur road. Instead the Board relied solely
upon the 1961 State of Idaho Map, in concluding that the spur road was a County road. 14
For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner submits that such reliance is in direct conflict
with the holding of Homestead Farms, Inc, v. Board ofComm 'rs of Teton County, 141
Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005).
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that only when the existence of a road is
"established," does the burden shift to the opponent of a public road to prove
abandonment. See Floyd v. Bd. of County Comm'rs ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,
728, 52 P.3d 863, 873 (2002). In that case the Court found that because the evidence
showed that the County had worked on the road for an eight year period, the road was
established as a County road and the challengers had to meet the tall burden of proving
abandonment. However, such is not the case here. There was simply no evidence that the
spur road had ever been "established" under the statute. Thus, Board erred in finding that
the burden shifted to the Petitioner to show abandonment.
To establish the existence of a road, the Board must follow formal procedures
outlined in Title 40, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code or undertake judicial action. The
existence of a public road may be established if the road is formally "laid out, recorded,
and opened" in a manner that provides the county with an interest in the real property of
the road, or where the road is "used for a period of five (5) years, provided [it] shall have
been worked and kept up at the expense of the public." I.C. § 40-202. In Floyd, the

14Jt should be noted that the same problem exists as to the Meyers' failure to prove the frontage road had been
validated under Title 40 or that the County had used and maintained the frontage road for the required five (5) year prescriptive
period.
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Supreme Court affirmed these requirements. "The criteria to determine a public road has
been stated as follows: 'When a right-of-way has been used by the general public for a
period of five years and has been maintained at public expense, the right-of-way becomes
a public highway." 137 Idaho at 725, 52 P3d at 870 (emphasis added) (quoting State ex
rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146,594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979)). The Supreme Court
will not sustain a validation proceeding where a governing board makes inadequate
findings concerning the use and maintenance of the road. See Galvin v. Canyon Highway
Disi. No.4, 134 Idaho 576, 580, 6 P.3d 826, 830 (2000) (remanding the case because
"[t]he Board made no findings of fact regarding the establishment and use" of the road in
question).
In this case, the only evidence concerning the spur road was a 1961 State of Idaho
highway map - not a County map as required by I.C. § 40-202 - and the conclusory
statements by counsel for the Meyers and the County Road Supervisor's claim that the
County was "working on" declaring the spur road as a County road. Board Tr. p.81,
L.16-17 and Board Tr. p.93, LA through p.95, L.7. When pressed the County Road
Supervisor conceded that the current County map did not show the spur road as a County
road.
MR. STORER: May I ask just one question?
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: You bet.
MR. STORER: Mr. Eckersell, what does the County Map currently show as far as
this Spur road, County or not?
MR. ECKERSELL: It's on the map that we are working to have formally adopted
22
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by the County. It is not on the most current State inventory map. But it was on the
'61 map."
MR. STORER: I didn't ask that question. What does the current map show?
MR. ECKERSELL: The current [County] map does not show a spur road.
Board Tr. p.94, L.20 through p.95, L.7 (emphasis and material in brackets added). At that
point, Commissioner Christensen interjected with an argument in favor of validating the
road on the theory that it had never been abandoned.
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: Let me address that.

***
You might look at the evidence they've presented, but there was simply no
record of an abandonment of that, and simply removing it from a map, as I
understand, that does not constitute an abandonment.
Board Tr. p.95, L.11-21. In effect Mr. Christensen simply assumed the existence of a
County road rather than requiring proof that the spur roads had been "established" either through a statutory validation proceeding, judicial proceeding or a credible proof of
prescriptive use. Then, by that artificial assumption, Commissioner Christensen shifted
the burden to the Petitioner to show that the spur road had been abandoned, despite the
lack of any proof that the spur road had been acquired by formal dedication, by statutory
validation, judicial declaration or by prescriptive use for the required five (5) year period.
An argument similar to that employed by the Board here has been previously
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. "Certainly, if a road is not properly created as a
public highway, its inclusion on an official county highway system map does not make it
so .... " Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board o/Comm 'rs o/Teton County, 141 Idaho 855,
23
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860, 119 P.3d 630,635 (2005). The Court then went on io hold that Teton County was
required to conduct the necessary validation hearing before adding roads to the County
Road Map. Here, there is no evidence that the spur road was ever "properly created" as a
County road. Rather, the County relied solely upon the 1961 State of Idaho map as a basis
for its conclusion that the spur road was a County road. To paraphrase the Homestead
Farms case, "inclusion on an official [State] highway system map does not make it SO."15
The Board here made the same mistake as was made by the Board of Commissioners of
Teton County -

that is they assumed the mere inclusion of the spur road on the State of

Idaho map was sufficient proof of the existence of the County road - and then shifted the
burden to Petitioner to prove otherwise. As noted in Homestead Farms, such burden
shifting is improper.
Because the road was never properly established in the first place, it was improper
for the Board to shift the burden to Petitioner to show "abandonment." This Court should
reverse and remand, with instructions to the Board to confine its deliberations to
ascertaining the existence of an express dedication or determining whether a prior
statutory or judicial validation has been conducted.

IV.
The Board Violated Petitioner's Due Process Rights by Finding the Existence
of a County Road.
In Idaho, principles of "due process [are] applicable to proceedings on a request to
change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property, regardless of whether
ISIt is also worthy of note that the 1961 map was a State map, not a County Map.
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the subject of such proceedings carries the label 'variance' or 'rezoning. '" Gay v. County

Comm'rs o/Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,651 P.2d 560,563 (Ct.App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[d]ue process concerns have led us to say that
'[ a]n administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party
with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. '" Hernandez
v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005) (quoting White v. Idaho Forest

Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977)). Other courts have noted that
"[ 0 ]ne

of the basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be appraised of all

the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain, or
rebut such evidence." In re Guardianship ofMEO, 2006 WY 87, ~ 38, 138 P.3d 1145.
The February 28,2007, hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission was
based on the premise that a variance was necessary because the Meyers' owned "parcels
without the required 100 foot of road frontage." Comm. Tr. p.2, LA-8. The Planning and
Zoning Commission's findings specifically stated that "[t]hese tracts ofland have no
frontage on a currently maintained road." Comm. R.p.178. While there was some
discussion at the February hearing about the location ofthe Bone Road, and whether the
frontage road serving the old Bone Store was a County road, (Comm. Tr. p.2l, L.15
through p.22, L.l), there was no contention at the Planning and Zoning Commission
hearing that the spur road ever was, or now is, a county road. Thus, at the September 6,
2007, hearing before the Board, Petitioner had no notice or fair warning that the spur
road's status as a county road would be an issue. Because Petitioner had no notice that the
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spur road's status would be an issue, Petitioner had no opportunity to marshal or present
evidence concerning the spur road. Board Tr. p.96, L.23 through p.97, LA. Nevertheless,
the Board allowed the introduction of evidence concerning the status of the spur road,
Board 'fr. p.81, L.16-17, and then totally ignored the County Road Map and its statutory
obligation to conduct a validation hearing before adding a new road to the County Road
Map. Board R. p.l37. Simply stated, the Board declared the existence ofa County road
across Hawkin' s property without ever affording him fair notice and a hearing.
The spur road was not on the present County road map, and that fact should have
been the end of it. Alternatively, the Board should have followed the procedure under
Title 40, Chapter 2, Idaho Code, to determine whether there was a basis for adding the
spur road to the County Road Map and should have given Petitioner fair notice of its
intent to consider that issue. Until such proceeding is conducted, it was improper to rely
upon the spur road as a basis for concluding that the two ranch houses in fact had frontage
on a County road. Thus, the Board's decision violated Petitioner's due process rights and
the matter should be reversed and remanded with instructions to the Board to limit its
consideration solely to ascertaining whether there as been an express dedication or a prior
statutory or judicial validation.

v.
The Board Erred in Finding That a Taking of the Applicants' Property
Would Occur Absent a Variance.
A.
Amortizing a Non-conforming Use over a Reasonable Period of Time Does
Not Constitute a Taking.
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Merely requiring that a particular nonconforming parcel comply with the
requirements of a zoning ordinance after the nonconforming use has been discontinued
does not constitute a taking. See, e.g., City ofBelton v. Smoky Hill Ry. & Historical

Society, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 429 (Mo.Ct.App. 2005) (finding that compliance with the
discontinuance provision of a local ordinance was not a taking and holding that
"[b ]ecause the use of the tracks was discontinued for more than twelve months, Smoky
Hill must comply with all applicable zoning ordinances"); Hinsdale v. Village ofEssex

Junction, 153 Vt. 618, 572 A.2d 952 (1990) (upholding a provision in a zoning ordinance
that prohibits restoration of a nonconforming use if it has been discontinued for a period
of six months or more); Hartley v. City of Colorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216 (Colo. 1988)
(upholding a provision in a zoning ordinance that requires nonconforming uses that have
been discontinued of a period of one year or more to thereafter comply with all provisions
of the code).
Under Idaho law, that a regulatory taking occurs only if an ordinance immediately
"prohibit[s] the continuation of all existing lawful [uses] within a zoned area."

O'Connor, 69 Idaho at 41, 202 P .2d at 404. Further, a regulatory takings claimant must
demonstrate that the property owner has been deprived of all viable economic use of his
property. See e.g. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832
(2002). As long as the property owner may make some reasonable use of its property
following the passage of an ordinance, then there is no taking even though the value of
the property may be significantly diminished. Id. Further, in regulatory takings claims,
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courts employ a "parcel as a whole" rule which requires examination of the entire parcel
rather than small segments, in determining whether or not viable economic use still exists.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F. 3d
764 (9 th Cif. 2000); Aff'd 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct, 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002).
In this case, Meyers presented no evidence whatsoever of any inability to use their
property if the County's non-conforming use provisions were enforced. To the contrary,
they freely admitted they had been using their property for many years as a dry farm and
they presented no evidence that the County's enforcement of its non-conforming use
provisions would have deprived them of all viable economic use of their dry farm.
If a County were to immediately terminate a lawful use, without allowing the
continuance of the non-conforming use, such would be a taking "because not to allow
them to continue would be a violation of the due process clause." Heckv. Commissioners

a/Canyon County, 123 Idaho 826, 829 853 P.2d 571,574 (1993) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). However, "due process does not prevent the county from
exercising its police power even though the exercise may affect the pre-existing use of the
property." Id. "Both conforming and nonconforming uses are subject to ordinances and
regulation of a police nature predicated upon protection of the public health, safety,
welfare, and general good." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
"power to zone derives from the police power," (Sprenger, Grubb Associates. Inc. v. City

o/Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 583, 903 P.2d 741, 748 (1995», and though not unlimited,
"[t]he police power is one of the least limitable of governmental powers, and in its
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operation often cuts down property rights." Heck, 123 Idaho at 830, 853 P.2d at 575
(quoting Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxi, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1346)).

In Idaho, a Taking Does Not Occur Where Property Is Impacted by a
Zoning Ordinance, Provided the Property Retains Residual Value.
B.

In the zoning context, the Idaho takings analysis focuses largely on economic
principles. Idaho courts have held that a "zoning ordinance that downgrades the economic
value of private property does not necessarily constitute a taking by the government,
especially if some residual value remains" after the ordinance is applied to the property.

Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832 (2002) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "nonconforming property enjoys no
special immunity from reasonable [zoning] regulations .... " Bastian v. City a/Twin

Falls, 104 Idaho 307,309,658 P.2d 978,980 (Ct.App. 1983).
The rationale behind these holdings is that a "property owner has no vested interest
in the highest and best use of his land, in the solely monetary sense ofthat term."

Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City o/Hailey, 127 Idaho 576,581,903 P.2d 741,
746 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If a property owner is subject
to "zoning regulations which merely restrict the enjoyment and use of property through
lawful exercise of the police power. , . he is not entitled to compensation." Id. at 747, 903
P.2d at 582. In City ofHailey, the city's decision to change the applicable zoning
classification reduced the value of plaintiffs business property by $800,000. 127 Idaho at
581,903 P.2d at 746. The Supreme Court went so far as to acknowledge that "[i]t can be
plausibly argued that the rezoning deprives [the plaintiff] of the highest and best use of its
29
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land." Id. Nevertheless, the court found the consequences of the rezone were "not so
much as to constitute a taking" because the plaintiff still had "adequate options for
commercial enterprises." Id. Another court, construing similar variance requirements,
explained that "[h ]ardship is not demonstrated by economic loss alone ... Every person
requesting a variance can indicate some economic loss. To allow a variance any time
economic loss is alleged would make a mockery of the zoning program." Xanthos v. Bd.

ofAdjustment a/Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984).
In this case, without referring to any specific factual basis for its conclusions, the
Board found that "[i]t would be a taking of land rights to say after an ordinance changed
that they would no longer be able to maintain their residences without first obtaining road
frontage to continue an allowed use on the land." Board R.p.136. As an initial matter, that
statement does not accurately reflect the facts of this case. The BCBZO has existed since
1959. The County's adoption of the frontage requirement at issue here did not require the
Meyers (or their predecessors) immediately to obtain frontage in order to continue the
residential use of the properties. In fact, the ordinance expressly allows nonconforming
uses to continue. However, consistent with the zoning policy principles outlined above, §
1-203 provides that if the residential use is discontinued, any subsequent use of the
property must comply with all the provisions of the ordinance, including the frontage
requirement. In this case, the residential use has been voluntarily discontinued since at
least 2001. According to § 1-203 any further use must be in conformance with the
ordinance. As noted above, the enforcement of discontinuance provisions does not give
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rise to a taking.
In sum, the Meyers applied for the variance because their parcels lacked the
necessary County road frontage under § 1-707. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.2-7. They presented no
proof that enforcement of the discontinuance provision, would have deprived them of all
viable economic use oftheir property. As the Board noted, the Meyers' property is in an
agricultural zone. Board R.p.135. The agricultural zone, among other uses, allows "[t]he
growing, handling, and storing of agricultural and livestock products, the location of
buildings, structures, equipment, and facilities incident thereto .... " BCBZO § 1-702(1).
Meyers presented no proof of an inability to use their property for agricultural purposes.
The frontage provision which creates the nonconforming use in this case, only
applies to residential uses. BCBZO § 1-708. Thus, like the property at issue in City of
Hailey, the Meyers have "adequate options" for economically beneficial use of their

property as a dry farm. Because the Meyers property retains residual value, no taking
would occur if the Board fully enforced the non-conforming use provisions of the County
Zoning Ordinance.

VI.
The Board Erred in Finding That the Non-conforming Use Status of Meyer's
Property Was a Special Circumstance That Justified the Granting of a Variance.
A.
The Adoption of the Zoning Ordinance is Not a Special Circumstance
Because the Zoning Ordinance Is Applicable to All Property in Bonneville County, Not
Just the Meyers' Parcels.

Although the Board has authority to grant variances to the strict application of the
zoning ordinance under BCBZO § 1-511, that authority is limited to situations where
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"special circumstances peculiar to the particular lot or parcel" prevent use of the property
in a manner reasonably similar to other lots in the same zone. The special circumstances
must not "apply generally to the other properties in the same zoneo" BCBZO § 1-511.
Before granting a variance, the Board must find that special circumstance are such that a
strict application of the ordinance would deprive "appellant's property.

0

•

of privileges

possessed by the properties in the same zone." BCBZO § 1-511.
In this case, both the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board found that
"special" circumstances attach to the Meyers' parcels because "they were developed prior
to the effective date of the Zoning Ordinance." Comm. R.p.183 and Board R.p.136. The
mere fact that the two old, log ranch houses were constructed prior to the adoption of the
street frontage provision of the BCBZO does not create a special circumstance because
Meyers' property is no different than any other non-conforming use in the CountYo Stated
otherwise there is nothing "special" or "unique" about non-conforming uses - they
frequently result when a governing entity changes a zoning regulation or law. If the
Board's logic were adopted, every non-conforming use would constitute a "special
circumstance" Justifying a variance and the restrictions in the non-conforming use
ordinance designed to eventually bring the use into conformance, would be totally
thwarted. The Board's logic is entirely circuitous. In effect, the Board's logic is this: If
a non-conforming use can be shown, such non-conformity is a "special circumstance" and
therefore is grounds for granting a variance. Accordingly, because of the non-conforming
use status is a "special circumstance" the property owner need not comply with the non-
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conforming use provisions. Such logic is absurd and would allow property owners in
every case to entirely circumvent the restrictions in the ordinance designed to gradually
eliminate the non-conformity.
Similarly, to premise the finding of a "special circumstance" upon the fact that the
governmental entity caused the non-conformity is equally illogical. A non-conforming
use is always caused by the governmental agency. Non-conforming cases are a direct
result of the governmental entity's passage of a ordinance that makes the existing use
"non-conforming." Once again, if the fact that the governmental entity is the cause of the
non-conformity is grounds for granting a variance under the "special circumstance"
provisions, such would entirely circumvent the non-conforming use provisions - all nonconforming uses would constitute "special circumstances." In this case, the County's use
of that boot strap was nothing more than a device to circumvent the application of their
own ordinance.
In summary, the Board's action undermined the objective of "gradual elimination
of non-conforming uses ..." O'Conner v. City a/Moscow, 69 Idaho at 42,202 P.2d at
404; see also Basitan v. City a/Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307,309,658 P.2d 978, 980
(CLApp. 1983). By premising the variance on the fact that the adoption of the street
frontage provision was a "special circumstance" that justified the granting of a variance,
the Board essentially gutted its non-conforming use ordinance. The non-conforming use
ordinance clearly regulates the scope of the nonconforming use and plainly provides for
eventual elimination ofthe nonconforming use. See BCBZO §§ 1-201 and 1-203. If the
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Board's logic is adopted, all non-conforming use would be a "special circumstance"
justifying a variance, and the non-conforming uses restrictions could be circumvented in
every instance.
B.
Created.

The Meyers Did Not Qualify for a Variance Because The Hardship Was Self

As noted above, the use of the two ranch houses was discontinued while Meyers
owned the property. Hence, their need for a variance was self-created and they do not
therefore qualify for a variance under the express terms of the BCBZO.

VII.
The Board Had No Authority under the Non-conforming Use Provisions of
the BCBZO to Allow Entirely New Structures "Without Placement or Size
Limitations."
As noted above, the Commission found that there was no enlargement of the land
required for the construction of the two new residential structures, and accordingly
Meyer's proposal did not violate BCBZO § 1-202. Comm. R. p. 177. As noted above,
the board adopted the findings of the Commission. Board R. pp. 135 through 137. The
Commission thus concluded that Meyers' application was consistent with BCBZO § 1202, notwithstanding the express language stating that "[N]o permits shall be issued
which shall have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to the non-conforming
use ... " The Board adopted the same conclusion and then, without citing to any
provision in the BCBZO, it added that "normal interpretation of the ordinance is to allow
the use to continue and even develop and expand, so long as they do not make the noncompliance worse." Board R. p. 136. (Italics added). The Board further concluded that
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Meyers' application should "be approved for the replacement of the two homes without
placement or size limitations." Board R. p. 137.
In reaching these conclusions, the Commission and the Board simply ignored the
unambiguous language of their own ordinance and the well recognized case law cited
above regarding liberal construction of ordinance provisions limiting expansion or
continuation of non-conforming uses. Meyers' application clearly sought authority to
construct two entirely new dwellings with larger foot prints at different locations on the
property. Comm. Tr. p. 29, LL 21 - 24; p. 100, LL 1 - 3. The BCBZO expressly states
that "[N]o non-conforming use of building, structure or land shall be extended or
enlarged." BCBZO § 1-201. (Italics added). The BCBZO also provided that "[N]o
permit shall be issued which shall have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to
the non-conforming use." The Board's and Commission's conclusion that the above
language referred to only the size of the land is directly inconsistent with the specific
reference in § 1-202 to "increasing the floor space." Further, the Board's conclusion that
the application should be granted "without placement or size limitations" is directly
contrary to the express provisions of the Ordinance stating that "no non-conforming use
of building, structures or land shall be extended or enlarged." Simply stated, both the
Board and the Commission simply ignored the plain language of their own ordinance.
Idaho Courts have held on numerous occasions that "a non-conforming use is not allowed
to expand." See Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners, 124 Idaho 392,397,860 P.2d
8, 13 (Ct. Appt. 1993). Local zoning authorities have no authority to ignore the plain,
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unambiguous language of their own ordinance. Fisher v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho
349,346, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (S. Ct. 2004); Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, 140 Idaho
115, 120, 190 P.3d 340,345 (S. Ct. 2004). Where an agency acts without authority, "it is
acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Ibid.
In sum, both the Commission and the Board ignored the plain language of the
BCBZO. The Board had no authority whatsoever to allow the proposed enlargement,
relocation and construction oftwo entirely new structures "without placement or size
limitations." The purpose of the non-conforming use provisions in the BCBZO was to
provide for the "gradual elimination ofthe non-conforming use." 0 'Conner v. City off
}vfoscow, supra. Contrary to that self-evident intent, the Board's allowance of the

Meyers' application accomplished just the opposite, to wit: Enlargement and
continuation ofthe non-conforming use. The Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The Board's determination should be reversed,
and the matter should be remanded with instructions to comply with the provisions of §§
1-201 and 202 of the BCBZO.
CONCLUSION
The Board and Commission committed numerous errors as a matter of law. The
Board clearly applied the wrong standard in determining whether or not the use of the two
old ranch houses had been discontinued for a period of more than one year. The Board
also erred in relying upon the 1961 State of Idaho map and in finding the "spur road" to
be a County road, without conducting the required validation under Title 40, Chapter 2 of
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the Idaho Code. The Board also violated Hawkins' due process rights in failing to
provide him with fair notice and a hearing prior to declaring the existence of a County
road across his property. The Board also erred in concluding that non-conforming use
status, precipitated by the County's adoption of the frontage requirement, was a "special
circumstance" justifying the granting of the variance. Finally, the Board erred in
concluding that it would be a "taking" of the Meyers' property if the Board enforced the
terms and conditions of its non-conforming use ordinance.
Accordingly, the Board's decision should be reversed, and the lapse of the nonconforming use declared as a matter of law. Alternatively, the matter should be remanded
with directions to the Board to follow the plain language of the BCBZO.

11

DATED this

tJ.

day of September, 2008.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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490 Memorial Drive
Post Office Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone (208) 522-3001
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Attorney for Respondent Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

IN RE:

Case No. CV-07-6123

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling
on Parcels Without the Required 100,

RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE
COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE
BRIEF

STAN HAWKINS
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v.

DALE and MARLA MEYER, husband and
wife, GREEN VALLEY RANCH, INC.,
Applicants.
COMES NOW, the Respondent, Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, and
pursuant the Court's Minute Entry on Status Conference entered July 29,2008 and Rule 84
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - I

of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure submits its Response Brief.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an action filed by Stan Hawkins ("Hawkins") under the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act (Idaho Code § 67-5201 et seq.) seeking judicial review of the Bonneville
County Board of Commissioner's ("the Board") decision to approve the variance applied for
by Green Valley Ranch, Inc. (an Idaho Corporation owned by Dale and Marla Meyer)
("Meyers") to replace two residences on two large adjoining tracts of land owned by the
Meyers identiiied by the Bonneville County Assessor's office as parcel numbers
RPOIS40E292513 and RPOI S40E206478. Board R. p. 93. 1

B. Course of Proceedings
On or about J anumy 16, 2007, the Meyers filed an "Application for Variance",
which sought to establish the right to replace residences on two tracts of land owned by
them. Comm. R. p. 1. The Meyers wanted to validate that they had the ability to build
replacement dwellings on their two parcels of propeliy in light of the fact that they believed
that currently neither parcel of property had the required frontage along a county approved
road as set forth in Bonneville County Zoning & Building Ordinance § 1-707. Comm. Tr. p.
2, 11. 13-22. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments ("the Commission") heard the
application on the night and early morning of Februmy 28, 2007 - March

1,

2007 and at the

conclusion of the hearing made a verbal determination granting the Meyers' "Application
IRespondent Bonneville County will refer to the record created before the Board of County
Commissioners as "Board R. _ _" and the record created before the Planning and Zoning Commission as
"Comm. R. _ _" and refer to the bates-stamped numbers of said records just as in Petitioner's brief to maintain
consistency and conformity for the Court.
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for Variance". Comm. Tr. pp. 134-135. 2
On March 8, 2007 Hawkins filed a Notice of Appeal to the Bonneville County Board
of Commissioners ("the Board"). Comm. R. pp. 185-187. Thereafter, the Commission
issued its "Report of Findings and Decision" dated May 23, 2007, which set forth in writing
the Commission's decision to grant the Meyers' Application for Variance. Comm R. pp.
175-179. Hawkins then filed an Amended Notice of Appeal dated June 19,2007. Board R.
pp. 73-75. The Board heard Hawkins' appeal de novo on September 6, 2007 and issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Decision dated October 5, 2007 in which the Board upheld
the Commission's decision to grant the Meyers' Application for Variance. Board R. pp.
135-137. Hawkins then filed a Petition for Judicial Review with this COUli dated October
26,2007. Board R. pp. 128-132.
C. Statement of Facts
The Meyers own two adjoining tracts of land identified by the Bonneville County
Assessor's Office as parcel numbers RPO 1S40E292513 and RPO 1S40E2064 78, referenced
respectively as the Jefson Homestead and the Rockwood Parcel. Board R. p. 93. The
properties at issue are designated as an Agriculture area on the zoning map of Bonneville
COllnty, which allows a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. Comm. R. p. 175;
Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance ("BCBZO") § 7-102. The properties
have been used for agricultural and residential uses since approximately 1910 and 1936
respectfully. Comm. R. p. 175; Board R. p. 136. The dwellings on the propeliies were built

2 For consistency and conformity the transcript of the February 28, 2007, hearing before the Bonneville
County Board of Adjustments is cited herein as "Comm. Tr.'· and the transcript of the September 6, 2007 hearing
before the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners is cited herein as "Board Tr.".
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prior to the effective date of the BCBZO. Comm R. p. 175; Board R. p. 136.
The Jetson Homestead is situated south and west of the present Bone Store in
Bonneville County, Idaho. Located approximately 114 mile west of the Bone Store is the
eastern boundary of the Rockwood Parcel. Jd. The Meyers have owned the Jefson
Homestead since 1972 and their predecessors in interest relate back to Mangus Jefson, who
was granted a patent deed to the property in 1915. Board R. 48. Before obtaining the deed,
.T efson had constructed a dwelling in parcel sometime between 1910 - 1912. Comm. Tr. p.
15, 11. 3-4. Since then the dwelling has been kept and maintained. Comm. Tr. p. 17-18 .
.Tefson sold to Orin Hayden and Hatden built a small store situated on the n0l1heast corner of
the Jefson Homestead fronting what was then the public Bone Road. Hayden then sold to
Spencer Williams.
In 1928, Williams began operating the original Bone Store and established the Bone
Post Office. Comm. Tr. p. 17, 11. 13-15. Early photographs show the Bone Road running
the along the east front orthe Bone Store and nearby Bone School and such photographs
show the spur road running east from the Bone Road just north of the store. Board R. pp. 43,
51. From approximately 1972 to 1999 the Meyers rented the dwelling on the lefson
Homestead to tenants and otherwise improved the dwelling. Comm. Tr. p. 18, 11. 7-21.
However, owing to the eruption of a spring on the front side of the dwelling, said dwelling
was no longer habitable and the Meyers moved the dwelling and placed it on moving
timbers and bank of dirt where it cun-ently rests. Comm. R. p. 22, 11. 9-14.
Don Ranberg and Ruby Ranberg were the early owners of the Rockwood Parcel and
they constructed a dwelling on their land in 1936. COl11m. R. p. 6, 11.10-12. Subsequently,

RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - 4

59

Max and Maxine Rockwood bought the propeliy and lived in the dwelling until 1992.
Comm. R. p. 6, 11. 12-14. In 2001 the Meyers purchased the Rockwood Parcel from the
Rockwood's daughter and have made improvements to the dwelling and surrounding
property since that time. Comm. R. p. 6, 11. 17-25; p. 7, 11. 1-3. However, due to the
dwelling's proximity to Canyon Creek, the dwelling is in a flood plain and must be removed.
Comm. R. p. 8, 11. 4-9. Access to the dwelling on the Rockwood Parcel has always been by
way of the spur road. Comm. R. p. 178.
Several sworn affidavits were presented attesting to the fact that the original Bone
Store was located south and west of the existing Bone Store and that when the original Bone
Store was operating, a public access road ran along the front of the store and that the spur
road was a public access road servicing the school and houses west of the original Bone
Store. Board R. pp. 29-41. Sometime in the late 1950's Bonneville County changed the
course of the Bone Road near the original Bone Store resulting in movement of the road
eastward. Comm. R. p. 19, 11. 10-12. Consequently, the Jefson Homestead lost its road
frontage property and a gap of land was created between the new Bone Road and the old
road, store, school, and spur road. Comm. R. p. 19,11. 10-21.
The gap is the narrow strip of land owned by Hawkins and identified by the
Bonneville County Assessor's Office as parcel number RP01S40E292415. Board R. p. 50,
93. The Hawkins property abuts Bone Road on its eastern boundary and abuts the Jefson
Homestead on its western boundary. ld.
Crossing the northern portion of the Hawkins property and a few hundred feet to the
immediate south of the current site of the Bone Store is the aforementioned spur road, which
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begins at the Bone Road and runs west for approximately 114 mile terminating in the lefson
Homestead. Board R. p. 50. According to Idaho Transportation Department road
maintenance maps for 1961, the spur road was designated as part of Bonneville County's
public road system and according to Bonneville County records the spur road was never
vacated/abandoned. Board R. p. 50; Board Tr. p. 93,11. 1-20. Since the movement of the
Bone Road, the spur road continued to be used by the public and landowners to access the
dwellings on the lefson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel and the Meyers have used the
spur road for ingress and egress to the dwellings and farm ground since acquiring ownership
to the properties.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek
judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided
for in the Idaho Admininstrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code § 676521 (1)( d). For purposes of judicial review ofLLUPA decisions, a local
agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is
treated as a govenunent agency under IDAP A.

Cowan v. Board o[Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247,
1254 (2006) (citations omitted).
The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record.

Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, _,180 P.3d 487, 491 (2008) (citations
omitted).
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: '(a) in
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violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion.' The party attacking a zoning board's decision must
first illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and must then
show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. Finally,
planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity;
this includes the board's application and interpretation of their own zoning
ordinances.

Cowan v. Board olCommissioners a/Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508,148 P.3d 1247,
1254 (2006) (citations omitted).
"Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence, but
more than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Board a/Commissioners 0/ Fremont County, 143 Idaho
501,517,148 P.3d 1247,12563 (2006) (citations omitted).

III. ARGUMENT
A.

Hawkins' Petition for Judicial Review fails as a matter of law because
Hawkins cannot show that a substantial right of his has been prejudiced in
this matter.

Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2)
and (3) of this section, agency action shall be af1irmed unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced." The Idaho Supreme Court has found that such "substantial
rights" include a person's ability to access their propeli)' and develop their propel1y for
permissible uses. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City a/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, _ , 175 P.3d
776, 780 (2007).
No substantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this
matter. The propeliies at issue are designated as an Agriculture area on the zoning map of
Bonneville County, which allows a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. Comm.
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R. p. 175; Bonneville County Building and Zoning Ordinance ("BCBZO") § 7-102. For
approximately ninety (90) years (1910 - 1999) the lefson Homestead had an occupied residence,
which time period includes time in which Hawkins owned his narrow strip of property that abuts
the lefson Homestead (Hawkins has owned the narrow strip of property since 1998). Comm. Tr.
p. 18, 11. 7-21; Board R. pp. 81-84. However, owing to the eruption of a spring on the front
side of the dwelling, said dwelling was no longer habitable and the Meyers moved the
d"welling and placed it on moving timbers and bank of dirt where it currently rests. Comm.
R. p. 22, 11. 9-14.

For approximately sixty-five (65) years (1936-2001) the Rockwood Parcel had an
occupied residence, which time period includes time in which Hawkins owned his narrow strip
of property that abuts the lefson Homestead (Hawkins has owned the narrow strip of property
since 1998). Comm. Tr. p. 6, 11. 8-25, p. 7,11. 1-14; Board R. p. 81-84. However, due to the
dwelling's proximity to Canyon Creek, the dwelling is in a flood plain and must be removed.
Comm. R. p. 8. 11. 4-9.
Thus, the variance requested (to replace the two homes on the two different parcels
of land) does not change the zoning of the properties, does not change how the propel1ies
have been used for approximately ninety (90) and sixty-five (65) years respectively, does not
change the zoning of Hawkins' property, does not affect how Hawkins uses his property (as
the variance merely maintains the status quo on how the other properties have been
historically used); does not restrict Hawkins' development of his propeliy; and does not
restrict Hawkins' access to his property. In shOl1, no substantial rights of Hawkins are even
being affected by this variance let alone being prejudiced. All that the variance
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accomplishes is maintenance of the status quo; which is that the two parcels of property
which have always had dwellings on them may continue to have dwellings on them.
Therefore. Hawkins Petition for Judicial Review should be denied because no substantial
rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this matter.
B.

Hawkins contention that the Board erred in Evaluating the Meyers'
Nonconforming use under an "intent to abandon" rather than a
"discontinuance" standard is of no relevance in this matter because the
existence of dwellings on the parcels of property has never been and is not
now a nonconforming use under the Bonneville County Zoning & Building
Ordinance.

Chapter 7 of the BCZBO, enacted in 1959, applies to the agriculture zone covering the
Meyers' real property at issue in this matter. Section 1-702 of the BCZBO states in pertinent
part: "The following shall be permitted in the A-I Agricultural Zone: 4.(a) Dwelling with a
minimum lot size of one acre ... " The Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "'Nonconforming
llse' means use of land which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and
which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with
llse restrictions." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-609, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42
(1989). Hawkins argues that per BCZBO § 1-203 the Meyers alleged discontinued use of the
dwellings on their two parcels of property should now preclude them from building new
dwellings on the property.
However, BCZBO § 1-203 only applies "[i]f a nonconforming use of land ... is
discontinued for one (1) year or more". BCZBO § 1-203 has no applicability in this matter
because the fact that the Meyers have had dwellings on the two parcels of property has never
been and is not now a nonconforming use. As set forth above, BCZBO § 1-702 specifically
allows use of agricultural land for a dwelling with a minimum lot size of one acre. The only
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - 9
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"nonconforming" aspect of planned dwellings on the Meyers' two parcels of property is the one
hundred (100) feet of frontage on an approved County road, not the fact that there are dwellings
on the property. The variance granted by the Board was relief from the road frontage
requirement, it was not a variance to allow building of dwellings on agricultural land because
such use is now and always has been a conforming use. Comm. R. p. 177; Board R. p. 136.
Thus, 1lawkins' attempt to contend that the existence of the dwellings on the agriculture land was
a nonconforming use and apply the provisions of BCZBO § 1-201 is without merit because the
existence of the dwellings on the Meyers' property was never a nonconforming use of the land.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board to grant the Meyers request for a variance should be
affirmed.
Even assuming, for purposes of argument only, that BCZBO § 1-203 has some relevance
in the matter at hand there is no question that an intent to abandon standard has been utilized by
Bonneville County when considering discontinuance under BCZBO § 1-203. As set forth above,
the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held: "Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a
strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and interpretation of its
own zoning ordinances. Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 12L
176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007) (citing Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254) (emphasis
added).
One of the specific discussions by the Bonneville County Board of Adjustments (which
was adopted and incorporated as an integral part of the Board of Commissioner's October 5,
2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Decision) was:
The board reviewed replacement of a home owned by the Byrnes near Ririe that
did not have frontage on a county approved road. The house had burned down
RESPONDENT BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER'S BRIEF - 10

approximately 10 years earlier and the board reviewed the right to rebuild even
though it was past the one year time period. The board determined that there
was no intent to abandon this property. The intent to abandon must be
proven and not simply non-use of the property. The board did not require the
Byrnes to rebuild a duplicate of the burned structure.
Comm. R. p. 177 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that Bonneville County has applied and interpreted BCZBO § 1-203 as
being subject to an intent to abandon standard. What Hawkins is asking this Court to do is force
the County to apply and interpret BCZBO § 1-203 inconsistently and differently than it has in the
past and to conform with his personal interpretation of the ordinance. However, such a request
must be denied because an agency's application and interpretation of its own ordinances are
entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Further, abandonment signifies an intent to give up a
right of use shown by evidence of both (1) intent, and (2) some act or failure to act indicating the
relinquishment of a right. "Intent cannot be infened by non-use alone." 83 ANJUR.2D Zoning
and Planning § 611. At no time have the Meyers expressed or implied an intent to abandon

using the Jefson Homestead and the Rockwood Parcels for dwellings. Comm. R. p. 175; Comm
Tr. p. 20, II. 1-3; Board R. p. 137.
In short, the Meyers' planned construction of dwellings on their propeliy is a conforming
use because their land qualifies for use of dwellings thus precluding any application of BCZBO §
1-203. However, even assuming BCZBO § 1-203 is examined it is clear that in other matters
involving said section the County has applied an intent to abandon standard and the evidence is
overwhelming that the Meyers have never abandoned the use of their land for dwellings.
Accordingly, the October 5,2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision of the Board
should be affirmed.
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C.

The Board never found that the Spur Road was a County Road in this
proceeding; the Board merely commented on the evidence presented about
the Spur Road and found that such evidence was further evidence of special
circumstances that justified the granting of a variance.

Hawkins spends a great deal of time and effort alleging that the Board declared that
the spur road in this case was a County road. However, such a contention is a red herring. If
the Board had declared or found that the spur road was in fact a County road there would
have been no need to grant the Meyers a variance because the spur road would have
provided the required road frontage. However, the Board did approve the variance and
nowhere in its decision did it declare that the spur road was a county road. What the Board
actually stated in its October 5,2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision \vas the
following:
Based on the evidence submitted it would appear that the Board of
Adjustment conclusion that the alignments of Bone Road have been modified
over time and that based on new evidence that the spur road which runs to the
west of from Bone Road also existed. There was no evidence submitted that
these two roads were ever formally abandoned. These facts alone would
justify the granting of this variance.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the testimony and the evidence submitted it is the opinion of this
Commission that the findings of the Board of adjustment were proper and that
the variance was properly granted. The evaluation of the case in the Board of
Adjustments findings was validated and reinforced with the documents and
affidavits submitted by the Meyers.
Board R. p. 137.
BCZBO § 1-707 states in full: "The minimum width of any lot on which a dwelling
is situated shall be one hundred (100) feet along a county approved road." Idaho Code § 676516 provides in pertinent part:
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A variance is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the
ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard, rear
yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the
structure upon lots, or the size of lots.
Variances are also provided for in the BCZBO. BCZBO § 1-511 states in pe11inent
part:
Before a variance can be granted, the Board of Adjustment must find upon the
evidence that:
(a) Special circumstances do actually attach to the particular property
covered by the application which do not generally to the other
properties in the same zone.
(b) Because of some special circumstances the appellant's property is
deprived of privileges possessed by the properties in the same zone.
(c) The granting of such variance will not substantially affect the
comprehensive plan of zoning in the county.
(d) Adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties
and hardships, the imposition of which is Ulmecessary in order to carry
out the purposes of the zoning plan.
(e) The hardship is not the result of any action by the prope11y owner
taken after the effective date of this ordinance.
1.

Special Circumstances

In accordance with the above authorities, it was within the power of the Board to
grant a variance from the width requirements of BCZBO § 1-707. Both the Commission and
the Board found that special circumstances do actually attach to the Meyers' property
covered by the frontage requirement which do not apply generally to the other properties in
the same zone. The special circumstances include but are not limited to the following:
The J efson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel have had dwellings since 1910 and
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1936, respectfully. The Meyers presented evidence in the form of several sworn affidavits
attesting to the fact that the original Bone Store was located south and west of the existing
Bone Store and that when the original Bone Store was operating, a public access road ran
along the front of the store and that the spur road was a public access road servicing the
school and houses west of the original Bone Store. Board R. pp. 29-41. The Meyers also
presented evidence that sometime in the late 1950's Bonneville County changed the course
of the Bone Road near the original Bone Store resulting in movement of the road eastward.
Coml11. R. p. 19,11. 10-12. Consequently, the 1efson Homestead lost its road frontage
property and a gap of land was created between the new Bone Road and the old road, store,
school, and spur road. Comm. R. p. 19, 11. 10-21. Access to the dwelling on the Rockwood
Parcel has always been by way of the spur road. Comm. R. p. 178.
Additionally, the Meyers presented Idaho TranspOliation Depalil11ent road
maintenance maps for 1961, which showed that the spur road was designated as part of
Bonneville County's public road system and according to Bonneville County records the
spur road was never vacated/abandoned. Board R. p. 50; Board Tr. p. 93, 11. 1-20. Since the
movement of the Bone Road, the spur road continued to be used by the public and
landovvners to access the dwellings on the lefson Homestead and Rockwood Parcel and the
Meyers have used the spur road for ingress and egress to the dwellings and farm ground
since acquiring ownership to the properties.
Further, the Meyers' parcels of land are special in that they were developed and
dwellings were constructed on them prior to the effective date ofthe BCZBO, meaning that
there exists an established right to have dwellings upon the parcels even if they do not
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comply with every standard in the BCZBO. The dwellings themselves are an allowed use
on the land and therefore it cannot be said that the dwellings are a nonconforming use. In
fact the parcels comply with every pmi of the BCZBO except for one item, the lack of
frontage on an approved maintained road (which might not even be true per the evidence
submitted regarding the spur road).
The Commission and Board (adopting the Commission's Report of Findings and
Decision) specifically found that the foregoing facts and issues were special to the Meyers'
property that do not apply generally to the other properties in the same zone. Comm. R. p.
178; Board R. p. 136. It is in instances like this that variances were created and are allowed,
i.e. a variance is only sought when an exception to the BCZBO is needed. Clearly, the
Board's findings (based upon the substantial and competent evidence presented as set forth
above) support their determination and finding that special circumstances attach to the
Meyers' property which do not apply generally to the other properties in the same.
2.

Deprivation of Rights/Privileges Possessed by Properties in Same Zone

Both the Commission and the Board found that because of the special circumstances
identified above, the Meyers' property would be deprived of privileges possessed by
properties in the same zone. Namely, the Meyers' parcels of property would be deprived of
the privilege and right of having dwellings located on them, which right and privilege is
possessed by properties in the same zone and has been a right and privilege exercised by the
parcels since 1910 and 1936 respectfully.
3.

Bonneville County Comprehensive Plan

The Commission and the Board found that the Comprehensive Plan of Bonneville
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County will not be substantially affected by granting the variance because the existence of
d'wellings on the Meyers' parcels of land is a conforming use for their property and such use
has existed since 1910 and 1936 respectfully. The Commission and Board also found that
there were ver.y few parcels in the County that would have the same conditions of the parcels
at issue in this case and as such would not substantially affect the Comprehensive Plan or the
zoning in the County.

4.

Difficulties and Hardships

The Commission and Board found that adherence to the strict letter of the BCZBO
was not necessary in this case to protect the purpose of the zoning plan. The Commission
and Board point out that the dwellings existed on the parcels long before the adoption of the
Comprehensive Plan. In addition, strict adherence to the letter of the BCZBO would cause
difficulties and hardships, namely it would prevent the Meyers from el1joying the right and
privileges associated to the land which have been enjoyed for years and will prevent the
Meyers from enjoying the same rights and privileges enjoyed by properties in the same zone.

5.

Hardship was not created by the Meyers

The Commission and Board specifically found that the hardship in this matter was
not created or the result of any action taken by owner of the property. The Commission
stated:
It was created by two events: (1) the realignment and movement of Bone

Road, and (2) the adoption of the Zoning Ordinance after the uses were
already established. The county might have taken the frontage away from one
of the parcels without having held a road vacation hearing.
Coml11. R. p. 178.
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In addition, the only reason the Meyers needed to seek the variance for the building
of two new dw"ellings on the parcels was because: (1) The eruption of a spring on the front
side of the dwelling on the lefson Homestead, making said dwelling no longer habitable
Comm. R. p. 22, 11. 9-14; and (2) The fact that the dwelling on the Rockwood Parcel is
located in a t100d plain and must be removed. Comm. R. p. 8,11. 4-9. Neither of these
hardships was caused by the Meyers.
Thus, both the Commission and Board found substantial and competent evidence
which satisfied the requirements for a variance and therefore granted the variance. The
decision to grant the variance is entitled to a strong presumption of validity and accordingly
should be should be upheld by this Court.
D.

Any argument concerning a regulatory taking in this matter is not ripe and
therefore nonjusticiable.

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
We deem it necessary to consider an issue not presented by the parties.
Though neither party has argued the issue, ripeness is a prerequisite to
justiciability and we cannot ignore it. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d
1128, 1132 (9 th Cir. 2005). Generally speaking, where a zoning ordinance
includes a procedure for obtaining a variance from the prescribed
requirements, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe until the landowner has
requested and been denied the variance. Williamson Planning Comm 'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 187-88, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116-17, 87 L.Ed.2d
126, l39-40 (1985).

City o.fCoeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845, 136 P.3d 310,316 (2006) (emphasis

added).
In this case, the Meyers requested a variance and were granted a variance, the
principal reason being that the Commission and Board determined upon the evidence
presented that special circumstances attached to the Meyers' propeliy which did not apply
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generally to the other properties in the same zone as set forth in section C of this brief above.
Com111. R. p. 178, Board R. p. 136. There has been no denial of a variance in this matter and
therefore per the Idaho Supreme COUli's statement in Simpson a regulatory taking analysis in
this matter is not ripe and therefore not properly brought before this Court at this time.
In sum, the Meyers' applied for a variance and were granted a variance in this matter
because both the Commission and the Board found that the evidence presented met the
prerequisites for granting a variance as set forth in the BCZBO. While both the Commission
and Board reference a taking of land rights in their decisions, such statements are mere
obiter dictum and were not necessary to their ultimate decision for granting the variance,
which was based upon the existence of special circumstances outlined previously. No
regulatory analysis was undeliaken by the Commission or Board and since the variance was
granted the issue of regulatory takings is not ripe now and therefore is nonjusticiable.
E.

The Board had authority to allow entirely new structures without placement
or size limitations because the nonconformance in this case ,vas road
frontage not the dwellings themselves.

BCZBO § 1-201 states in pertinent paJi: "no nonconforming use of buildings,
structures or land shall be extended or enlarged." BCZBO § 1-202 states in paJi: "no permit
shall be issued which will have the effect of increasing the floor space devoted to the
nonconforming use ... " In this case, the nonconforming use is the lack of one hundred (100)
feet of County road frontage. The dwellings on the Meyers' parcels of property are
conforming uses, as the BCZBO specifically allows dwellings on property zoned
Agricultural as the Meyers' propeliy. BCZBO § 1-702. Thus, it is the land itself not the
dwellings on the land which cause the nonconforming use. The Commission (and the Board
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adopting and incorporating the Commission's decision) recognized this when it concluded:
Regarding Section 1-201, the new buildings should be allowed. The
non-conforming use of the buildings, structures or land would not be extended
or enlarged by allowing new buildings on the parcels. Rather, the structures
and the land would still be used for residential purposes, and there is no intent
to enlarge or extend the size of the non-conforming parcels of land.
Regarding Section 1-202, the non-conforming use is not limited to
repairs or to the same footprint. The land, not the buildings, are in nonconformance due to the lack of road frontage.
Comm. R. p. 177.
Thus, by granting the Meyers application for a variance (which variance relates
solely to the road frontage provision because the dwellings themselves are a conforming use)
the nonconformance, the road frontage, is not being enlarged or expanded because the land
itself is not being enlarged or extended. In addition, BCZBO § 1-202 is not violated in this
case because the dwellings in this matter are a conforming use of the propeliy and therefore
there is no increase of floor space devoted to a nonconforming use. Accordingly, Hawkins
contention that the Board had no authority to allow the new structures and that it ignored
BCZBO §§ 1-201, 1-202 is without merit and the Court should uphold the Board's decision
to grant the Meyers' application for a variance.
CONCLUSION
Hawkins Petition for Judicial Review should be denied solely on the basis that no
su bstantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by the Board's action in this matter. The
Board's action does not affect the zoning of Hawkins' property, does not affect Hawkins' access
to his property, does not afTect Hawkins' development of his property, does not affect Hawkins'
use of property, and merely maintains the status quo, which is the Jefson Homestead and
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Rockwood Parcel may continue to have dwellings upon them as they have since 1910 and 1936
respectfully.
The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record.
Spencer

l'.

Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, _,180 P.3d 487,491 (2008) (citations

omitted).
"[P]lanning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this
includes the board's application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances."
Cml'an v. Board o/ColJ1missioners

(~fFremont

County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247,

1254 (2006) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Meyers presented substantial and competent evidence to both the
Commission and Board in support of their application for a variance. The only variance sought
in this matter was relief from the road frontage provision because the dwellings located on the
properties were and are a conforming use. Evidence showed that one of the Meyers' parcels
(Jefson Homestead) did in fact have the required road frontage at one time, however, due to the
County moving Bone Road such road frontage was taken away. Evidence also showed that the
other parcel (the Rockwood Parcel) had a dwelling on it since 1936 and that the spur road which
has always provided access to the parcel might be a public road which provides the necessary
frontage. Nevertheless, the right to have a dwelling on the parcel was established before
enactment of the BCBZO. Further, the Meyers never intended to abandon the dwellings located
on their two parcels of property. Based upon the evidence presented, both the Commission and
the Board determined that the Meyers had met the requirements for a variance as set forth by
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Idaho statute and the BCZBO and therefore granted the same.
As Idaho law has repeatedly held, planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong
presumption of validity, including the application and interpretation of their own zoning
ordinances. Therefore, based upon the record before the Court and arguments presented herein
the Board respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Board granting the
Meyers application for a variance.
DATED this

/(J

day of October, 2008.
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A.

~G.HAL'L
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Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

INRE:
Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.

Case No. CV-07-6123

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,
v.

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

ORIGINAL

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and submits the following
Memorandum Brief in response to Respondent's Brief dated October 10,2008.
I.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review

1.

A.

The Commissioners' Conclusions ofLaw are Reviewed De Novo.

Respondent argues that this Court should "defer to the agency's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous." Respondent's Brief at 6. In making such argument,
Respondent misconstrues the Petitioner's challenges here as challenging the Commissioners'
factual findings. Such is simply not the case. All ofthe challenges raised by Petitioner focus
upon the County Commissioners' erroneous interpretation of the non-conforming use and
variance provisions of the Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance (the "BCZBO") and upon
the County's inordinate determination that the dirt lane across Petitioner's property was a
county road, the existence of which justified the Board's issuance of the variance. All of
these issues are questions of law and as such are entitled to no deference whatsoever.
When reviewing a land use decision, "The Board of Commissioners is treated as a
government agency." Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508,
148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). Unlike its findings of fact, the Board's conclusions oflaw are
entitled to no deference whatsoever, rather Idaho courts "exercise free review over the
agency's conclusions of law." Matter of Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 904
P.2d 556 (1995). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a county's
"[ e ]rroneous conclusions of law may be corrected on appeal," regardless of any deference
2
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accorded to factual findings by the agency. Allen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138, 141, 953
P.2d 578, 581 (1998). Here Petitioner is challenging the Board's conclusions oflaw and as
such, the Board's conclusions are freely reviewable and entitled to no deference from this
Court.
B.

The Board's Interpretation of its Own Ordinances is a Question ofLaw.

Respondent also argues that the Board's interpretation of its zoning ordinance is
entitled to deference. Respondent's Briefat 10. However, in this regard the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated that "[i]nterpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an
issue of law and therefore an appellate court exercises free review." Friends of Farm to

Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). For the reasons
explained more fully in Section 3(A) below, the Board's interpretation of the BCBZO was
clearly erroneous and such interpretation is freely reviewable by this Court as a matter oflaw.
In this case, the Board relied on three key conclusions oflaw in its decision to approve
the Mevers' variance. First, that an "intent to abandon," rather than a "discontinuance"
standard was the proper way to analyze the non-conforming use provisions found in § 1-203
ofthe BCBZO. Second, that the Meyers' proposed residential use in an agricultural zone,
without the frontage required under BCBZO § 1-707, was a "special circumstance" justifying
issuance of a variance from the non-conforming use provisions, because the spur road was
a county road. Finally, the Board concluded that Meyers should be granted a variance
because of "special circumstances" associated with the County's alleged relocation ofthe old
Bone store frontage road, notwithstanding that the Meyers caused the need for the variance
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(i.e. their failure to maintain non-conforming use status and their desire to enlarge and
relocate the old ranch houses). Had the Meyers maintained their non-conforming use of the
two ranch houses and been content to reside within the existing structures, the parties would
not be before the Court today.
All of the Board's conclusions are conclusions oflaw and as such are entitled to no
deference. Because the Board's conclusions were erroneous in numerous respects and
because the material facts are undisputed, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and
deny the variance as a matter of law.

2.

Mr. Hawkins has Standing to Bring this Petition Because He is an "Affected
Person" Within the Meaning of the Statute and the Board's Decision Prejudices
his "Substantial Rights."
Respondent asserts that "[n]o substantial rights of Hawkins have been prejudiced by

the Board's action in this matter." Respondent's Brief at 7. Respondent has obviously never
experienced the maddening frustration of spending countless hours trying to round up
hundreds of head of cattle scattered across the hills of Bone, as a result of a careless
teenager's failure to close the gate. That circumstance is a very real possibility should
Meyers be granted the right to build two new residences, both of which necessarily would
derive gated access across Petitioner's ranch property. (See Comm. R. p. 68, LL. 3-6 and
p. 80, LL. 2-4, where Petition testified that the installation of a gate was necessary because
he uses the property to graze livestock.) Aside from the foregoing possibility, Petitioner
would have standing if for no other reason than the variance expanded the existing access
across his property from a somewhat infrequent agricultural use to a daily, year-round
residential use.
4
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In making its standing argument, Respondent ignores two fundamental facts. First,
the Board's granting of the variance altered the status quo (i.e. granted a residential use
where none existed before) and secondly, in so doing significantly expanded the scope and
the impact of the use of the spur road upon Hawkins' property. Specifically, Respondent
argues that the variance merely maintains the status quo "which is that two parcels of
property which have always had dwellings on them may continue to have dwellings on
them." Respondent's Briefat 9. Respondent's argument however ignores the current status
quo - that is there is currently no residential use of the single lane farm access road crossing
Hawkin's property-a circumstance that has existed since at least 200 1 and probably longer.
To argue that the variance did not change the status quo, simply ignores the Meyers'
testimony that they had abandoned one of the ranch houses because of its state of disrepair
and that they had not used the other since 2001. Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 14-15.
More importantly, the Board's decision significantly alters the scope and frequency
of Meyers , use of the spur road. Currently, the spur road is used for agricultural purposes,
primarily during the Spring planting season and during the Fall harvest.

The Board's

variance decision will now allow daily use ofthe road on a year round basis. Respondent's
argument simply ignores that the use of the spur road will change from infrequent
agricultural use to a daily residential use and from a seasonal agricultural use in the summer
to year-round access during the winter. Clearly, Mr. Hawkins "substantial rights" have been
affected by the Board's decision.
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The LLPUA states that "[a]ny affected person aggrieved by a decision may within
twenty-eight (28) days ... seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code." I.C. § 67-6521. As used in the LLUPA, an "affected person" means "one having
an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a
permit authorizing the development." Jd. A variance is a permit authorizing development.
I.e. § 67-6516.
Idaho cases state that an '" affected person" as "one having an interest in the real
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing
development." City ofBurley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,908,693 P.2d 1108,
1110 (Ct.App. 1984). In City of Burley, the court held that a municipality could be an
aggrieved person within the meaning of the statute merely because it had a general interest
in the "maintenance and development ofthe city and the property contained therein." Jd. In
Evans v. Teton County, the court held found that persons with property located 300 feet from
a proposed subdivision were "affected" under the meaning of the statute, despite the lack of
any proof of an adverse influence or affect upon the adjoining properties (i.e. a mere
theoretical adverse effect is sufficient). 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). The court
there found that even though the landowner's property did not directly adjoin the subdivision,
the development's mere proximity to the neighboring properties "adversely affected" the
landowners. Jd.
In this case, Mr. Hawkins has more than a generalized interest in Meyers' proposed
development and more than mere proximity to the proposed development, as was the case
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in the City of Burley and Evans cases. Rather, Mr. Hawkins has a concrete and tangible
interest in the increased frequency and lengthened time within which traffic will cross his
land via the spur road. Unlike the petitioner in Evans, here Hawkins' property directly abuts
the property to be developed and all traffic originating therefrom will necessarily traverse
Petitioner's property once the new dwellings are constructed. Board R. p. 50.
In Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that a property owner who "live[ d] approximately 3.4 miles from the Project site" had
standing to appeal the decision of a county commission. 141 Idaho 784, 786, 118 P .3d 116,
118 (2005). The court there found that the mere possibility that an odor from the proposed
wastewater processing facility might be detected on landowners' distant property was
sufficient to devalue their property in a way that made them "adversely affected" for standing
purposes. l Id. at 787, 118 P.2d at 119. "[T]he Archibalds may be able to smell odors from
the Project on their property. This is sufficient for the Board to determine that the
Archibalds' property interest 'may be adversely affected' if the special use permit is
granted." Id. (emphasis added).
Unlike the 3.4 mile distance at issue in Gooding County, here Mr. Hawkins' property
directly adjoins the subject property and will bear the brunt of the traffic originating
therefrom. And, unlike the potential harm the court countenanced in the Gooding case, here
the harm is not speculative; if the variance is affirmed, Hawkins' property will be affected

lAlthough the court was evaluating standing under the Gooding County Ordinance, rather than the LLUPA, the
language used to confer standing was nearly identical to LLUPA's language: "one who has an interest in real property which may
be adversely affected" by the issuance of a permit. Gooding County, 141 Idaho at 786, 118 P.3d at 118; I.e. § 67-6521 (I)(a).
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by increased residential traffic over his property. Far from preserving the status quo, the
Board's decision significantly alters the manner in which the Meyer's parcels have been used
in the immediate past and places a new burden on Mr. Hawkins' property- a burden that did
not exist prior to the granting of the variance.

Clearly then, substantial rights of the

Petitioner have been prejudiced and as such Petitioner has standing under Idaho Code § 675279(4).

3.

The Board Erred in Applying an "Intent to Abandon" Rather Than a
"Discontinuance" Standard to the Meyers' Nonconforming Residential Use.
A.

Where the Language of an Ordinance is Unambiguous There is no Occasion
to Employ Principles ofStatutory Construction and no Reason to Defer to the
Board's Interpretation of the Ordinance.

Respondent argues that because the Board has applied an "intent to abandon" standard
when interpreting BCBZO § 1-203 in the past, the Court should defer to the Board's
interpretation in this case. Respondent's Brief at p. 11. In essence, Respondent argues that
because the Board has erred in the past, the Court should countenance continued error in the
future. The illogic of that argument is readily apparent.
Respondent further contends that "an agency's application and interpretation of its
own ordinances are entitled to a strong presumption of validity." Respondent's Brief at p.
11. However, there is no reason for the agency to "interpret" an ordinance if its language is
clear. In this case, the "discontinuance" language is unambiguous. Thus, the Court should
not defer to the Board's erroneous interpretation of the BCBZO and should apply it exactly
as it is written.

8 -
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Idaho courts "exercise free review over whether an agency's interpretation of a statute
[and whether such interpretation] should be afforded ... deference." Hayden Lake Fire

Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005). Importantly, the
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that deference is appropriate only where the language of
the statute is unclear. However, if the language is unambiguous, the Court need only apply
it as written:

[IJf the language is unambiguous, an agency's interpretation
contrary to the plain meaning of a statute will not be given
deference. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely
apply the statute.
Hamilton ex rei. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 572,21 P.3d 890, 894
(2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord, Ackerman v. Bonneville County, 140
Idaho 307,92 P.3d 557 (Ct.App. 2004) (citation omitted) ("If the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely apply the
statute."); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207,76 P.3d 951 (2003) (citations
omitted) ("Where the language of a statute is clear, this Court need only apply the statutory
language to the facts at hand."); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90
(2003) (citations omitted) ("If an ordinance is unambiguous, this Court need not consider
rules of statutory construction and the statute will be given its plain meaning."); The Senator,

Inc. v. Ada County, Bd. ofEqualization, 138 Idaho 556, 575, 67 P.3d45, 54 (2003) (Kidwell,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("If a statute is clear, this Court need not engage in an

exercise of statutory construction. The statute will be given its plain meaning.").
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In this case, the Board has not established any ambiguity. The Board merely adopted
the Board of Adjustment's presumptive statement that "intent to abandon must be proven and
not simply non-use of the property." Comm. R. p. 177. Respondent points to no ambiguity
which would necessitate statutory construction or "interpretation." Because there is no
ambiguity in the ordinance, it was inappropriate for the Board interpret the ordinance, and
the Board's interpretation is entitled to no deference whatsoever. It should have been applied
as written.
B.

The BCBZO Unambiguously States That Nonconforming Uses Lose Protection
When "Discontinued. "

Because the language ofthe BCBZO is unambiguous, this Court need only look to the
language of the statute and give the text its plain meaning. The ordinance says that lawfully
existing nonconforming uses lose their "grandfathered" protection of nonconforming use
status and must completely comply with all provisions zoning ordinance when the
nonconforming use "is discontinued for a period of one (l) year or more." BCBZO § 1-203,
(emphasis added). The ordinance could not be any more clear and this Court should give
effect to the words of the ordinance exactly as written. Equally important, the Court should
give not add words which are not in the ordinance (i.e. intent to abandon).
The drafters, had they wanted, could have included an abandonment standard, but did
not for good reason. As noted in the case authorities cited in Petitioners' earlier brief, use
of an abandonment standard encourages perjury and makes elimination of non-conforming
uses much more difficult. See e.g. Hartleyv. City ofColorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216, 1225
(Colo. 1988). Public policy favors the eventual elimination of nonconforming uses and Idaho
10
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Courts have repeatedly endorsed and upheld this policy. See, e.g., Bastian v. City a/Twin
Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App. 1983) (citations omitted) ("[T]he

public policy embodied in zoning laws 'dictates the firm regulation of nonconforming uses
with a view to their eventual elimination. "'). A simple "discontinuance" rather than an
"intent to abandon" standard best effectuates this public policy. See also Lessard v. Burnett
County Ed.

0/ Adjustment, 256 Wis.2d

821, 835, 649 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Wis.App. 2002)

("[T]he question of voluntary intent is irrelevant where the cessation of the nonconforming
use has endured for the requisite time under the ordinance." ) Id. at 837,649 N.W.2d at 736.
In sum, the Board patently erred when it injected an intent requirement into its
analysis of BCBZO § 1-203 and as such its decision should be reversed as a matter of law.

C.

The Board's Decision Should be Reversed as a Matter a/Law Because Meyers
Admitted They Discontinued the Residential Use a/Both Properties/or More
Than One Year.

There is absolutely no dispute that the Meyers discontinued the residential use of their
property for more than one year-Meyers admitted as much. At the hearing before the
Commission, the Meyers forthrightly admitted that residential use of the property had been
discontinued for a period of more than one year. Specifically, Marla Meyer admitted that
"nobody has lived in the [Jefson] home, not for - - oh, probably - - probably 10 years or
more." Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 16-17. The last tenant living in the Rockwood house "moved
out in the fall of 2001." Comm. Tr. p. 6, L. 18-19. There has been no residential use of
either parcel since that time.
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The evidence that the parcels have not been used for residential purposes for more
than one year is not disputed by either party. Thus, regardless of what the Meyers may have
subjectively intended with regard to their property, it is undisputed that the Meyers'
residential use of the parcels has been discontinued for a period well in excess ofthe one year
set forth in the non-conforming use provisions of the BCBZO. The Board clearly erred in
finding that BCBZO § 1-203 was inapplicable in this case and this Court should reverse the
Board's decision and find that the Meyers' non-conforming use has lapsed as a matter o flaw .
No purpose would be served by a remand, since there is no dispute that Meyers' use was
discontinued for a period greater than one year. 2

4.

The Board Erred in Finding That the Variance was Properly Granted.
A.

Contrary to Respondent's Contention, the Board Relied upon the Alleged
Status o/the Spur Road as a County Road in Granting the Variance.

Respondent argues that the status of the spur road as a county road is a "red herring"
because the Board "no where in its decision ... declare [d] that the spur road was a county
road." Respondent's Brief at 12. In making that argument, Respondent misses the thrust of
Petitioner's argument. Here, Petitioner does not directly challenge the County's unlawful
declaration of the spur road as a county road. Rather Petitioner challenges the Board's
determination that the spur road was a county road and its reliance upon such status as a
county road as a "special circumstance" justifying the granting of the variance. Specifically,
the Board made the following finding in its October 5,2007, decision:

2 The same thing is true of Meyer's eligibility for a variance. Since the record reflects without dispute that loss of the nOI1conforming use status of the old ranch houses was attributable to Meyers' decision to discontinue use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses and to
build two new ones, it fo1tows that they are not eligible for a variance, since the need for the variance was self-caused. See § 1-511 (3)(e),
BCBZO. Such issue can likewise be decided as a matter of law.
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Based on the evidence submitted, it would appear that the Board
of Adjustment conclusion that the alignments of Bone Road
have been modified over time and based on new evidence that
the spur road which runs to the west of the Bone Road also
existed. There was no evidence submitted that these two roads
were ever formally abandoned. These/acts alone wouldjust the
granting a/this variance. 3
Board R. at 137. (emphasis added)4
From the foregoing finding, it is clear that the Board concluded that the frontage road
and spur road were county roads, neither of which, according to Mr. Christensen, had been
"formerly abandoned," thereby constituting a "special circumstance" justifying the grant of
the variance. The focus of Petitioner's arguments in his opening brief is the Board's failure
to require proof of a properly conducted statutory validation hearing or of a judicial
validation declaring the existence of such public roads and the Board's reliance upon the
"assumed" status of the spur road as a public road, as the basis for its issuance of the
variance.
As was noted in Petitioner's opening brief, when Petitioner challenged the Meyers'
contention that the spur road's designation as a county road by the State justified the issuance
of the variance, Commissioner Christensen interjected with a comment that it was
Petitioner's burden to prove the County had abandoned the spur road as a county road:
COMMISSIONER CHRISTENSEN: Let me address that.

***
3The "new evidence" was the State Highway road map that was introduced for the first time on appeal to the Board.

4As noted in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's logic is very confusing, to say the least. If, as here determined by the Board, the
frontage road had not been abandoned as a public road, then its relocation (i.e. abandonment) could not serve as a "special circumstance"
justifying issuance of the variance. Further, if the spur road was indeed still a public road, then there was no need for a variance. In either case,
the two ranch houses would have met the necessary frontage requirement.
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You might look at the evidence they've presented, but there was simply no
record of an abandonment of [the spur road], and simply removing it from a
map, as I understand, that does not constitute an abandonment.
Board Tr. p.95, L.11-21. Based upon that erroneous placement of the burden of proof and
implicit assumption that the spur road had not been "abandoned" as a county road, the Board
then concluded that such facts alone ''justif[ied] the granting of this variance." See Board
R. p. 137.

In sum, contrary to Respondent's argument, the Board in fact relied upon the
"assumed" status ofthe spur road and frontage road as county roads as a special circumstance
justifying its grant of the variance. As was argued in Petitioner's Brief, that determination
was made without any proof of a prior statutory validation or judicial validation or proof that
either road was ever included as part of the County Road Map. In the absence of such
evidence, the Board's shifting of the burden of proof upon Petitioner and its reliance upon
the public status of these two county roads as a basis for its issuance of the variance, were
erroneous as a matter of law.
B.

The Board Erred in Finding the Existence a/Special Circumstances Justifoing
the Variance.

A variance is properly granted only where all the elements of the ordinance
authorizing the variance are met. I.e. § 67-6516. To grant a variance in this case, each of
the elements of BCBZO § 1-511 (3) had to be satisfied. s Just as they do with statues, Idaho

5

BCBZO § 1-511(3) states: "Before a variance can be granted, the Board of Adjustment must find upon the evidence

before it that: (a) Special circumstances do actually attach to the particular property covered by the application which to not
apply generally to the other properties in the same zone. (b) Because of some special circumstances the appellant's property is
deprived of privileges possessed by the properties in the same zone. (c) The granting of such variance will not substantially affect
the comprehensive plan of zoning in the county. (d) Adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties and

14

-

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

o·
vJ.

courts exercise "free review" over an agency's application of its own ordinances. State v.
Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 798, 172 P.3d 551,553 (Ct.App. 2007). In this case the Board erred in

granting the ordinance because there are no special circumstances justifYing the variance, the
Meyers' were not deprived of any privileges as a result of the lapse of their non-conforming
use and the Meyers' need for the variance was self-created. These conclusions are based
upon the Meyers' own testimony and there is no need to remand the matter for further
findings. The Court should simply rule that, based upon the Meyers' own testimony, they
were not entitled to a variance as a matter of law.
As more fully established in Petitioner's opening brief, there are no special
circumstances justifying the variance. See Petitioner's Brief at 31-34. Respondent raises
three theories in support of the Board's issuance of the variance. Respondent's Brief at 14.
First, Respondent asserts that the frontage road in front of the old Bone store was actually
a county road which at one point provided the Meyers' parcels with frontage on a county
road and that the County's alleged relocation of the frontage road was a "special
circumstance" justifying the issuance of the variance. Respondent's Brief at 14. While the
Petitioner strongly disagrees with the Board's factual finding regarding the relocation of the
frontage road, ultimately the Board's finding is irrelevant in light of the uncontested facts
presented to the Board. The Meyers' testified that the road was moved in 1958. Comm Tr.
p. 21, L. 22. However, at the Commission hearing, the County's Planning and Zoning
Administrator forcefully asserted that the frontage requirement was not adopted until 1959.

hardships, the imposition of which is unnecessary in order to carry out the purposes ofthe zoning plan. (e) The hardship is not
the result of action by the property owner taken after the effective date ofthis ordinance ... "
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Comm. Tr. p. 52, L. 22 through p. 54, L. 8. Accepting Meyers' version of the facts, it is
quite clear that the adoption ofthe frontage requirement by the County was the cause of the
non-conformity rather than the relocation ofthe county road. Specifically, in 1958, there was
no frontage requirement and the alleged relocation of the road did not cause the Meyers'
property to become non-conforming. The property was rendered non-conforming one year
later when the County adopted the frontage requirement - a circumstance that is no different
then any other circumstance where non-conformity is caused by the adoption of a zoning
regulation that is inconsistent with the present use of property.
In reality, the need for the variance arose, not because of the County's relocation of
the road, rather it arose because Meyers discontinued occupation of their non-conforming use
in 2001. Had the Meyers continued use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses, they would not
have lost their non-conforming use rights and there would have been no need whatsoever for
the variance.

Such uses could have continued exactly as they were, under the non-

conforming provisions of the County Zoning Ordinance. Respondent's argument simply
misses the substance and purpose of a variance and attempts to interject the irrelevant
concept of fault as a factor to weigh in determining whether or not a variance is or is not
appropriate. As was noted in Petitioner's earlier brief, a governing entity is always "at fault,"
in the sense that the very nature of a non-conforming use stems from non-conformity caused
by the governmental entity's adoption of a standard that renders the property nonconforming. Simply stated, the government is always "at fault" in that respect. To premise
the issuance of a variance upon such fault does nothing more than open the door to the use
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of the variance provisions in every case to circumvent the non-conforming use provisions of
the zoning ordinance. If fault were relevant, every non-conforming use would qualify for a
variance and the non-conforming use provisions would become meaningless. Conversely,
if indeed fault is a proper consideration, then fault lies at Meyers' feet when they elected to
discontinue use ofthe two dilapidated ranch houses and expand into two entirely new houses.
Similarly, Respondent argues that "the Meyers' parcels ofland are special in that they
were developed and the dwellings were constructed on them prior to the effective date of the
BCZBO." Respondent's Brief at 14. Such argument is again nothing more than a bootstrap
to use the variance provisions as a device for circumventing the non-conforming use
provisions of the BCZBO. Again, if having an "established right" is the only requirement
for securing a variance from the non-conforming use provisions, then every non-conforming
use would warrant the issuance of a variance. The existence of a pre-existing lawful use
rendered non-conforming by a new ordinance is always the case. Once again, Respondent
is attempting to use the variance provisions to bootstrap its way around and away from the
enforcement of its own ordinance in accordance with its terms. The "general concept of
zoning policy [is] that nonconforming uses should not be allowed to expand and eventually
should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 396, 398, 529 P.2d 1268, 1270
(1974). The Board's decision goes exactly the opposite direction.

C.

The Need/or the Variance Was Caused by the Meyers.

That the need for the variance was caused by the Meyers is self-evident from the
record. The Meyers purchased the Jepson parcel in 1972 and the Rockwood parcel was
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purchased in 2001. Board R. p. 48; Comm. R. p.6, LL 17-25; p. 7, LL 1-3. No one has lived
in the J efson House for "probably 10 years or more." Comm. Tr. p.25, L.16-17. The
Rockwood House has been uninhabited since 2001. Comm. Tr. p.6, L.17 -19. Clearly the
discontinuance of such use occurred during Meyers' watch and such discontinuance is what
brought the Meyers to the Board of Adjustment. Had they not discontinued their use of the
two ranch houses, there would have been no need for the variance and quite clearly the
Meyers would have been able to continue their pre-existing use of the ranch houses under
the non-conforming use provisions ofthe BCZBO. The realignment of the frontage road had
nothing to do with the need for the variance; the need for the variance was clearly caused by
Meyers' failure to maintain their non-conforming use and their desire to enlarge and
construct two totally new residential structures.
A variance is not appropriate where the applicant landowner creates the need for the
variance. BCBZO § 1-511(3)(e). In this case, both justifications for the variance were
created by the Meyers. Because of the age and condition of the homes, the Meyers initially
sought to restore the properties, but because of the magnitude of the restoration project, the
Meyers "lost interest." Comm. Tr. p. 26, L. 14-15. Then the Meyers made the decision to
discontinue use of the parcels, rather than repair the properties in a timely manner, which
would have been allowed under BCBZO § 1-202. The Meyers cannot use their own decision
to discontinue the use of the parcels as justification for a variance-that is exactly what
BCBZO § 1-511(3)(e) prohibits.
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Second, the Meyers want to construct new, larger homes in different locations on
property without the required frontage. Comm. Tr. p. 8, L. 6-7 and p. 99, L. 1-2. Thus, the
Meyers wish to be excused from the application of BCBZO §§ 1-201, 1-203, and 1-707.
Nonconforming uses are only protected to the extent that they existed when the zoning
ordinance was passed. O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 41, 202 P.2d 401,403

(1949). Further, "A nonconforming use is not allowed to expand." Taylor v. Ed. ofCounty
Comm 'rs, 124 Idaho 392, 397,860 P.2d 8,13 (CLApp. 1993). Meyers testified unequivocally

that they wanted to build larger homes to accommodate larger families. Comm. Tr. p. 98,
L. 19 through p. 99, L. 3. Their reasons for the variance, that is their desire to expand the size

of the houses, is entirely self-created and thus cannot justify the variance
The adoption of the frontage requirement in combination with the alleged relocation
of the frontage road, cannot serve as a basis for finding a "special circumstance" because
once adopted, the frontage requirement applied to all county properties-conforming and
non-conforming alike. In that respect, Meyers were no different than any other property
owner whose property was rendered non-conforming by that action. To call the adoption of
the frontage requirement a "special circumstance" is merely a way for the Respondent to do
an "end run" around compliance with its own ordinance. This is clearly not what the drafters
of the ordinance intended - they specifically included a provision to address uses which
became nonconforming because of the adoption of the ordinance. The drafters specifically
stated that existing nonconforming uses "may be continued to the same extent and character
as that which existed on the effective date of this ordinance," but that "[n]ew and additional
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buildings, structures and uses of land must conform to the provisions of this ordinance."
BCBZO 1-201.

Clearly the drafters did not contemplate that the creation of a non-

conforming use could be used as a "special circumstance" justifying the issuance of a
vanance.
D.

The Meyers are Not Being Deprived of Rights and Privileges Possessed by
Other Properties in the Same Zone; Rather, the Variance Gives the Meyers
More Rights and Privileges.

Respondent argues that unless the variance is granted "the Meyers' parcels of property
would be deprived of the privilege and right of having dwellings located on them, which
right and privilege is possessed properties in the same zone." Respondent's Brief at 15.
Respondent ignores that all residential properties in the A-I Agricultural Zone are subject
to the frontage requirements of the BCBZO. Far from being deprived of privileges possessed
by other properties, the Meyers want more privileges than are possessed by other property
owners in the A-I zone. Specifically, the Meyers want to be excused from complying with
the frontage requirements of § 1-707, a section which is applicable to every other person
wishing to construct a dwelling in the agricultural zone. Contrary to Respondent's argument,
the Meyers are requesting a privilege granted to no other resident of the County - that is the
right to construct two new residential structures without the required frontage and without
restriction as to size or location. Inexplicably, the Board seems all together too willing to
grant such special privileges notwithstanding the unambiguous provisions of its own
ordinance and the self-evident purpose of the frontage requirement. 6
6The Board's complacency here is most surprising given the evident purpose of the frontage requirement, to wit: easy access to
residential structures for fire trucks, ambulances, police vehicles and other public safety equipment. When lives are at stake one would assume
the Board would be most vigilant.
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The Meyers also contend that by not being able to construct dwellings they will be
deprived of a "right and privilege exercised by the parcels since 1910 and 1936."
Respondent's Brief at 15. This claim ignores the fact that "nonconforming uses have no
inherent right to be extended or enlarged." Bastian, 104 Idaho at 309,658 P.2d at 980. The
Meyers' only "right" after the adoption ofthe BCBZO in 1959 was to continue the residential
use of the structures to the same degree and extent as existed before its adoption. BCBZO

§ 1-201. They lost that "right" when they ceased using the buildings and opted to construct
two new, larger residences.
Because the Meyers were not deprived of rights possessed by other propeliies, the
Board erred in its determination that variance was properly granted. Further, based upon the
Meyers' admission that they voluntarily elected to abandon their efforts to restore the
dilapidated ranch houses and build two entirely new, larger residences, this Court should rule
as a matter of law that they caused the need for the variance and as such are not eligible for
a vanance.

5.

The Board Erred in Finding That a Taking of the Meyers' Property
Would Occur Absent Issuance of a Variance.

The Respondent argues that any discussion of a taking is "not ripe" and that the
Board's taking discussion should be considered dictum. Respondent's Brief at 18. This
assertion mischaracterizes the Board's decision. The Board unequivocally stated that for
them to not grant the variance "would be a taking of land rights." Board R. p. 136.
Obviously then one of the motivating factors behind the Board's decision to grant the
variance was its erroneous belief that its failure to do so would precipitate a "taking."
21
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Clearly this issue was a significant factor driving the Board's decision and as such it is
appropriately before the Court in this Petition for Judicial Review, regardless of whether a
takings claim was ripe for review. See I.C. § 67-6521(d).
As explained more fully in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's conclusion that a
takings would occur absent a variance was erroneous. See Petitioner's Brief at 26-31. In the
zoning context, Idaho courts have said that requiring compliance with newly enacted
ordinances constitutes a taking only where the "ordinance ... prohibits the continuation of
all existing lawful [uses] within a zoned area." 0 'Connor, 69 Idaho at 41,202 P .2d at 403.
However, no taking occurs where municipalities "firm[ly] regulat[ e] ... nonconforming uses
with a view to their eventual elimination." Bastian, 104 Idaho at 309, 658 P.2d 980. In this
case, the application of the County frontage requirement did not prohibit the continuation of
the nonconforming residential use of Meyers parcels. BCBZO § 1-201. In fact, the
ordinance would have allowed that use to exist indefinitely, provided the use was continuous
and did not expand. BCBZO § 1-203. However, because the Meyers discontinued the use
ofthe two old ranch houses and now want two new, larger residences at a different locations,
it is not a taking to now require them to fully comply with all the requirements of the zoning
ordinance.
In sum, Respondent's argument that the taking issue "is not ripe" and was mere obiter
dictum is nothing more than an effort to direct the Court's attention away from the Board's

reliance upon an erroneous takings analysis to justify its issuance of a variance. Simply
stated, there can be no taking of a right that did not exist. Respondent's reliance upon the
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takings issue as justification for granting the variance is clearly erroneous as a matter oflaw.
II.

CONCLUSION
The Board made numerous errors oflaw when evaluating the Meyers' application for
a variance. This Court may freely review any and all questions of law determined by the
Board and the Board's determination thereon are entitled to no deference whatsoever. The
material facts in this case are undisputed-that is, there is no dispute that the Meyers
voluntarily discontinued use of the two dilapidated ranch houses for a period of at least seven
(7) years. The County's non-conforming use ordinance clearly and unambiguously provides
that discontinuation of a non-conforming use causes its lapse. Meyers' need for the variance
was self-created by virtue of their decision to discontinue use of the existing ranch houses
and to opt for two newer, larger residential structures. Meyers simply want a privilege
possessed by no other resident of the County, to wit: the right to construct two new
residences devoid of any obligation to comply with the County frontage requirement.
Neither the circumstances nor the law justify excusing them from that duty.
This case presents the somewhat unusual circumstance where the Board's decision
should be reversed and the variance request should be denied as a matter oflaw, without any
need to remand the matter to the Board for further factual determination. The Meyers'
discontinuance of the use for a period of more than one (1) year is undisputed, the County's
non-conforming use provisions unambiguously provide for a lapse after non-use for a period
in excess of one (1) year and the Meyers do not qualify for a variance as a matter oflaw,
based upon the undisputed fact that they caused the need for the variance and are asking for
23
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a privilege possessed by no other citizen of the County. There is no need to remand for
further factual evaluation.
F or the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Board's decision and rule
that the variance should be denied as a matter of law.
DA TED this

J

r--d.
day of November, 2008.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.

Dale W. Storer

Daniel C. Dansie
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

INRE:

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123

MINUTE ENTRY

)

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
-vs.BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,
-vs.DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

December 1,2008, a Petition for Judicial Review of Agency's Final Order came on for
hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open cOUli at Idaho
Falls, Idaho.

:\IINllTE ENTRY I

Mrs. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk,
were present.
Mr. Dale Storer appeared on behalf of petitioner.
Mr. Blake Hall appeared on behalf of respondents.
Mr. Kipp Manwaring appeared on behalf of applicants.
Mr. Storer addressed the Court in support of the petition.
Mr. Hall responded in opposition and offered argument thereof.
Mr. Storer continued with argument in support.
The Court inquired of counsel and took this matter under advisement and would issue its
opinion and order in due course.
I

Court was thus adjourned.

JON.
c: Dale Storer
Blake Hall
Kipp Manwaring
120108AMShinduri #5

MINUTE ENTRY - 2

1[,4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,

Case No. CV-2007-6123

Petitioner,

OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER
ON PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

v.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER,
husband and wife,
Applicants.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On
February 28,2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning
Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new
construction.
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 2001, when the Meyers purchased the home
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 2001 the Meyers have maintained the home but it
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appears from testimony before the zoning commission that is has not been a year-round
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' propertyalso referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road.
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain.
The other parcel has a house refen·ed to as the 1efson house that was built in 1910. The
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears
from the record that the lefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a
new house on that parcel, as well.
The lefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the lefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the lefson house
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road.
The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet
of frontage on an established county road. The BOlmeville County Board of Adjustments voted
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming
historical use. Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the BOlmeville
County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a
county road.
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Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision
and, following voluminous briefing, this matter was called up for hearing on December 1,2008.
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion.

II.
ST ANDARD OF REVIEW
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act [(LA.P.A.)] governs the review of local
zoning decisions." Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d
583,586 (1998) (citing Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 437, 942 P.2d 557, 561
(1997)). In an appeal from the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity under
the LA.P.A., this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision.

Id. (citations omitted); Howard v. Canyon County Bd. ofComm'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d
709, 710 (1996) (citation omitted). Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute,
is an issue of law and therefore an appellate court exercises free review of the district court's
decision. See State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446,807 P.2d 1282,1284 (CLApp.l991).
This Court, however, does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence presented. LC. § 67- 5279(1). Rather, this COUli defers to the agency's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586
(citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998)) (citing

South Fork Coalition v. Board ofComm'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d
882, 885 (1990)). "In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id.
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[6] [7] The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made
upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.ld. (citing I.C. § 67-5279(3». The paIiy attacking
the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code §
67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial right has been prejudiced.ld. (citing
Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Ct.App.1996».
III.
ANALYSIS

A. No Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced

As a threshold issue, Respondents challenge Petitioner's ability to challenge the Board of
Commissioners' decision. "The party challenging the zoning board's decision must first show the
zoning board's error under I.e. § 67-5279(3), aI1d secondly, that such error has prejudiced a
substantial right of the party." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89
(Idaho 2007) (citing Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429 (1998».
Petitioner seeks judicial review under I.C. § 67-6521(d), which provides that "[a]n affected
person aggrieved by a [LLUP] decision may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies
have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title
67, Idaho Code."
Here, Petitioner maintains that he may challenge the variance because the variance will
lead to increased traffic on the access road across his property. Petitioner argues that traffic on
the road is currently limited to infrequent agricultural use. Increased traffic, Petitioner argues,
will also increase the possibility that his livestock will wander out of what is sure to be a more
frequently opened gate. Petitioner does not challenge the validity of the farm access easement.
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The court notes that although there were dicta in the County Commissioners' decision
referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road,the court does not take a position on that
classification and considers this appeal assuming the access road was an easement on Petitioner's
property.
Petitioner relies in part on the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Evans v. Teton County,
139 Idaho 71 (Idaho 2003). In Evans, the county commission approved a zoning change for a
developer seeking to subdivide a large agricultural plot into 500 residential lots, a resort hotel, an
l8-hole golf course, a helicopter pad, and many other commercial developments.
The court held that the petitioner landowner could challenge the county commissioners'
decision under I.e. § 67-6521. I.C. § 67-6521 (l)(a) defines an affected person as "one having an
interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit
authorizing the development." The court, reciting the long list of proposed developments, found
that "[c]learly, the appellants' properties may be adversely affected by" the development. Evans,
139 Idaho at 75. The court also held that" [t]he existence of real or potential hann is sufficient to
challenge a land use decision." Id.at 76.
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held adjoining landowners to have standing where a
neighbor sought to subdivide and develop 160 acres in HD Dunn & Son LP v. Teton County, 140
Idaho 808, 810 (Idaho 2004), though the court did not analyze the case in light of I.e. § 67-5279.
Respondents argue that the affect on Petitioner's rights in this case differs from HD Dunn
and Evans because here the use of the neighboring land does not change, and that the status quo
in place for decades is unchanged. Here, there is no subdivision of the land or development. The
only changes to the land adjoining Petitioner's would be the construction of new homes
replacing the homes that currently rest there. Additionally, Respondent argues that under § 67-
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5279(4), Petitioner has not shown that the "substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced" by the board's decision.
The facts of this case differ significantly from those of HD Dunn and Evans. In both of
those cases the petitioner's neighbor sought to fundamentally change the nature of the land use.
Both cases involved a minimum of 30 new non-agricultural lots and developments surrounding
the petitioner's agricultural home. The petitioners in the Evans case were protesting a major
mixed use development that completely changed the face of the property surrounding their home
and expected to bring in thousands of people to live and work.
This case involves replacing two dilapidated single family homes with two new
construction single family homes. The lots will not be subdivided and they will retain their
zoning and use as agricultural properties. In Evans the zoning change lead to a dramatic change
in the traditional agricultural use and quality of the land. Here, Petitioner's only complaint is of
harm from traffic that apparently ran regularly from the mid-20th century until 2001, several
years after Petitioner moved onto the property.
Most significantly, the variance does not affect the Petitioner's rights to his property nor
the Meyers' right to access their property. Had the board denied the Meyers' request in this case
the Meyers would have no less right to access their property by traversing Petitioner's property
than they had when Petitioner purchased the property in 1998. Petitioner offers no support for the
notion that the exercise of a pre-existing right can act to prejUdice a substantial right. In reaching
this decision, the court does not take a position on the dicta of the County Commissioners'
decision referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road.
Petitioner argues that he has a concrete and tangible interest in the increased frequency of
traffic going to the Meyers' property. Undoubtedly there will be more traffic on the access road
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if the Meyers build new homes on the property. However, that change does not represent a
material change in the burden on the easement and the change in traffic does not represent a
prejudiced substantial right. Under I.C. § 67-5279, Petitioner does not have the ability to petition
for judicial review.

B. County Commissioners Decision
In reaching this decision, the court does not take a position on the dicta of the County
Commissioners' decision referring to the Spur Road as an existing county road.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's and Commission's decisions is
DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ~ day of February, 2009.
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (LS.B. # 2166)
Daniel C. Dansie, Esq. (LS.B. # 7985)
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HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

P. O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CV-07-6123

INRE:
Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,

v.
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

ORIGINAL

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, moves the Court for an Order
reconsidering its Memorandum Decision dated February 2, 2009.
This Motion is made for the reason that said Decision fails to consider the effect the
Respondent's decision has for increasing the potential for fire hazard and property loss
arising from the Respondent's failure to enforce their frontage requirement and their issuance
of a variance with respect thereto. Specifically, the purpose of such frontage requirement is
to facilitate ready access of public safety and fire equipment and personnel to the residential
structures. The Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of uncontrolled fire
originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures and the spread of such
nre to the adjoining old growth quaking aspen groves, sage brush and the grain fields and
structures upon Petitioner's property.
By virtue of such potential risk for harm to person or property, Petitioner is an
affected person under Idaho Code § 67-6521 and as such has standing to challenge the
Commissioners' decision in this matter.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

.5

~

day of February, 2009.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofIdaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by
facsimile, as indicated below, with the correct postage thereon, on this

~

6"

day ofF ebruary,

2009.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ATTORNEY SERVED:
Blake G. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

(v) Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Kipp L. Manwaring
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271

( \./) Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c.
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BLAKE G. HALL
Idaho State Bar No. 2434
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone (208) 522-3001
Fax (208) 523-7354
ISB No. 2434

Attorney for Respondent Bonneville County Board Of Commissioners

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

IN RE:

Case No. CV-07-6123

App lication for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling
on Parcels Without the Required 100,

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

STAN HAWKINS
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v.

DALE and MARLA MEYER, husband and
\vife, GREEN VALLEY RANCH, INC.,
Applicants.
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COMES NOW. the Respondent, Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, and
hereby submits this memorandum in objection to petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ARGUMENT
A.

Hawkins' Motion for Reconsideration should be dismissed because Hawkins
is not allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of a District Court's Order
made in its appellate capacity in review of an agency decision.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B) provides that "a motion for
recons idcrat ion

0

r any order 0 f the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be

filed within fourteen (14) days after the entry of such order .... " The final judgment in this
matter came in the form of the Board of Commissioners' decision. That judgment was then
appealed to the District Court. Any motion for reconsideration should have been filed after
the decision of the Board of Commissioners. This matter came before the District COUli in
its appellate capacity, as an appeal of an agency decision. This cOUli was not the trial court,
and therefore, I.R. C.P. 11 (a )(2)(B) does not apply. The proper procedure for petitioner is to
file an appeal with the Supreme COUli instead of filing this motion for reconsideration. As
a result, this Court should dismiss the motion for reconsideration.
B.

Hawkins' motion for reconsideration should be denied because it is based
upon cvidence and argument that was not part of the agcncy record on
appeal.

Courts have refused to consider claims which are raised for the first time on appeal.
"A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later urge his
objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179
P.3d 303,306 (2008); citing Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357
(l982). In addition, "[s]ubstantive issues will not be considered the first time on appeal."
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2007 WL 4245905 at 3 (Idaho, Dec. 5,2007). "The longstanding rule

of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal."

Id.
In his motion for reconsideration, Hawkins claims that he has standing in this matter
because "the Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of uncontrolled fire
originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures and the spread of such
fire to the adjoining old growth quaking aspen groves, sage brush and the grain fields and
structures upon Petitioner's property." See, Motion/or Reconsideration, p. 2. Hawkins
claims that "by virtue of such risk" he is an affected person under Idaho Code § 67-6521.
However, this argument should not be considered by the Court because it was not raised in
the administrative proceeding before the Board of Commissioners. Hawkins has not cited to
a single fact in the agency record to show that this argument was presented to the Board of
Commissioners. In addition, a review of the briefs submitted on appeal reveals that this
argument was never even raised at the appellate stage of proceedings. There is no precedent
for considering new claims presented for the first time on a motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, the Court should deny Hawkins' motion for reconsideration.
C.

Hawkins' motion for reconsideration should be denied because there is no
evidence in the record to support his unsubstantiated allegation that the
commissioners' decision "substantially increases"the risk of fire on his
property.

Hawkins asserts a single bare legal conclusion in support of his motion for
reconsideration - that "the Commissioners' decision substantially increases the risk of
ullcontrolled fire originating within or upon the Applicants' two residential structures .... "

Scc, l'v1olionjhr Reconsideration, p. 2. There is no citation to any fact in the agency record to
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support this allegation in Hawkins' motion for reconsideration. The burden is on the
moving party to bring the trial court's attention to facts in the record which support an
allegation in a motion to reconsider, and the court is under no obligation to search the record
to determine if there are any facts to support the allegation. See, Coeur d'Alene A1ining Co. v.
First Nat 'I Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P .2d 1026 (1990). Due to the fact that Hawkins has
failed to cite to any evidence in the record to support the argument that there is a "substantial
increase" of risk of fire to Hawkins' property, this motion for reconsideration should be
denied. As it stands, there is no evidence before the court to support a finding that Hawkins
has standing to pursue the claims in this matter.
D.

Hawkins has not demonstrated that the variance will prejudice "substantial
rights" in his property.

In order to prevail on this motion for reconsideration, Hawkins must demonstrate
that he has standing. Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." The Idaho Supreme Court has found that such
"substantial rights" include a person's ability to access their property and develop their
property for permissible uses. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City a/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
_ , 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007). Hawkins argues in this motion that he has standing because
there has allegedly been a "substantial increase" in risk of fire originating on the Applicants'
two structures and spreading to Hawkins' property. He claims that this risk has arisen "from
the Respondent's failure to enforce their frontage requirement and their issuance of a
variance with respect thereto. Specifically, the purpose of such frontage requirement is to
facilitate ready access of public safety and fire equipment and personnel to the residential
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- 4

structures. ,.
Hawkins' argument assumes an incorrect and unsubstantiated interpretation of the
Bonneville County Zoning Ordinance. Hawkins implies that the only 'purpose' behind the
frontage requirement is to provide access for the fire department or other emergency
personnel. The Ordinance on the frontage requirement does not expressly refer to 'fire
department access,' and in reality the general policy behind the frontage requirement is
much more broad. Further, for purposes of this matter, it is not this Court's responsibility to
make an ad hoc interpretation of the policy behind the frontage requirement in the
Ordinance. If Hawkins wanted to contest the policy behind the frontage requirement with
regard to fire department access he should have submitted the issue to the Board of
Commissioners in the first instance.
There is simply no evidence to support the contention that the issuance of the
\ariance has prejudiced Hawkins' substantial rights in his property. There has always been
a risk of fire to the Applicants' property because of the existing dilapidated structures.
There has always been a lack of frontage on the Applicants' prope11y. There is no evidence
that issuance of the variance changed the "risk of fire," there is only the conclusory opinion
of Hawkins. If the court were to rely on conclusory hypotheticals, the court would have to
consider the possibility that the Applicants could construct agricultural structures on the
property without a variance such as a shop where welding and equipment fabrication would
occur, or a grain elevator, or hay shed - all of which uses are clearly within the normal
purposes of an agricultural zone. In any of those scenarios the increased risk of fire
originating on the Applicants' property and spreading to Hawkins' property would be much
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greater than if the Applicants were to re-build the two residences. Hawkins' unsupported
conclusions do not demonstrate that he will be substantially affected in his ability to "access
his prope11y" or "develop his property for permissible uses." Therefore, this court should
deny this motion for reconsideration.
In conclusion, the Court properly considered the evidence and applied the correct
legal standard on appeal in this matter. There is no reason to reconsider the Court's
decision. This motion for reconsideration filed by Hawkins should be denied based upon the
foregoing procedural and substantive shortcomings.

DATED

this~day of February, 2009.

~.ff(iL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certi1y that 1 served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the
following this;).L day of February, 2009, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary
postage affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail.
Dale W. Storer
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Kipp L. Manwaring
JUST LAW OFFICE
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271
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[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (LS.B. # 2166)
Daniel C. Dansie, Esq. (LS.B. # 7985)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
P. O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CV-07-6123

INRE:
Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent,
v.

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

ORIGINAL

COMES NOW Petitioner, Stan Hawkins, and hereby responds to Bonneville County's
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on February 27,2009.

ARGUMENT
A.

Petitioner's Motion for Consideration Is Based on I.R.C.P. 84(r) and I.A.R. 42,
Rather than I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).
Respondent argues that Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration will not lie because

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure only allow for reconsideration of an order of a trial cOUli.
Respondent misapprehends the basis for Petitioner's Motion. LR.C.P. 84(1') provides that,
"Any procedure for judicial review not specified or covered by these rules shall be in
accordance with the appropriate Rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules ... " LA.R. 42 does
provide for a petition for rehearing or reconsideration.

Petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration is brought under that Rule, rather than I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Accordingly,
Respondent's argument has no merit.
B.

Respondent, Rather than Petitioner, Raised the Standing Issue for the First Time
on Appeal.
Respondent argues that Petitioner's Motion should be denied because it contains

arguments that are raised for the firsttime on Appeal. Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. In this regard two points should be made. First, it was
Respondent, not Petitioner, who raised the standing argument for the first time on appeal.
Specifically, the Bonneville County Commissioners did not premise their decision upon
Hawkins' alleged lack of standing, nor did they object to Petitioner's alleged lack of standing
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at the outset of the hearing or at any time thereafter. The issue was raised for the first time
on appeal by the Respondent, not Petitioner.
Admittedly, Petitioner did not point to the fire hazard issue in its initial response to
the Respondent's Reply Brief. Rather Petitioner pointed to other factors demonstrating that
he was "affected by the issuance or denial" of the subject permit. As Respondent correctly
points out, a petition for judicial review is in the nature of an appellate proceeding, not a trial
proceeding. However, Respondent has pointed to no Rule of Appellate procedure providing
that a failure to raise an issue in a reply brief constitutes a waiver. To the contrary, as noted
above, the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically provide for the filing of petitions
for rehearing, wherein reconsideration of the Court's decision is expressly allowed.
In sum, it was the Respondent who raised the standing issue for the first time on
Appeal and Respondent has pointed to no Rule that would preclude the Court from
reconsidering its decision herein.
Ample Evidence Is in the Record to Support Petitioner's Standing in the Case.

C.

The County asserts that Hawkins' Motion for Reconsideration should be denied
because there is no evidence in the record to support his allegation that the Commissioners'
grant ofthe variance increased the risk of fire hazard to Hawkin's property. See Respondent
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.

Again, Respondent

misapprehends the focus of Hawkins' standing argument and further misconstrues the
minimal level ofproof required under Idaho Code § 67-6521. As noted earlier in Petitioner's
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Brief, Idaho Code § 67-6521 provides a right of an appeal to an "affected person." An
"affected person" is defined as "one having an interest in real property which may be
adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development ... "
(emphasis added). Clearly, there is no requirement for proof that the affected person
actually is or was affected by the issuance or denial of the permit. Rather, the statute is
forward-looking, (i.e. "may be affected ... "), for obvious reasons, to wit: Until the
permittee has actually started construction there is no way to determine whether or not the
affected person has been damaged. Consequently, in order to prove standing the Petitioner
is merely required to demonstrate a potential for being affected. There is no requirement
whatsoever to prove the risk has in fact materialized.
Aside from the lack of any obligation to prove the risk has actually materialized, (i.e.
that the Commissioners' decision has in fact produced a fire hazard), Respondent also
misapprehends the nature ofthe proof required to demonstrate standing. As noted above, the
issue is not whether the Commissioners' decision will in fact cause a fire hazard. Rather the
standing issue, merely involves an inquiry as to whether or not Hawkins falls within the class
of persons for whose benefit the frontage requirement was adopted. The determination of
the class of citizens for whose benefit the ordinance was adopted, is clearly a question oflaw
for which no proof whatsoever is required. As admitted by the Respondent at oral argument,
the purpose of the frontage requirement set forth in BCZBO § 1-707 is to facilitate
emergency access for police, fire and other public safety vehicles and personnel. That being
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the admitted purpose ofthe Ordinance, the question then becomes whether or not Hawkins
falls within the class of persons for whose benefit this Ordinance was adopted. It takes no
great stretch of imagination to conclude that the Ordinance was intended to protect
residential property owners, as well as adjoining land owners whose propeliy might also be
damaged by uncontrolled spread of fire. The record is replete with proof that Hawkins was
an adjoining property owner and from that fact alone, the Court can find standing to contest
the Commissioners' refusal to enforce the Ordinance.
In sum, there is no requirement whatsoever that Hawkins prove "that there is a
substantial increase of risk" to his property.

D.

Hawkins' Substantial Property Rights Are Potentially Jeopardized by the
County's Refusal to Enforce its Own Ordinance.
The County in effect argues that the risk of fire hazard was unchanged by their

decision and that Hawkins therefore has not met his burden of demonstrating that his
"substantial rights" have been prejudiced. See Idaho code § 67 -5279( 4). In making that
argument, the County confuses the difference between finding that "substantial rights" have
been prejudiced and the impossible burden of demonstrating some difference in the quantum
of fire risk in the "before" and "after" status of the Petitioner's property. As noted above,
"affected person" status does not require a showing of actual harm, in advance of the
implementation of the permit. Idaho Code § 67-6521 only requires the Petitioner to
demonstrate that his property "may be adversely affected." Thus in this case, there is no
requirement whatsoever that Hawkins demonstrate the actual occurrence of a "substantial
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increase" in the risk of tire originating from the applicant's structures. The question more
properly framed, is whether Hawkins' property may be affected by the issuance of the permit
(i.e. Hawkins was within the class of property owners whose property was the object ofthe
ordinance) and whether such property rights are substantial. The County cannot here argue
in good faith that Hawkins' property rights are insubstantial. As the record reflects, Hawkins
owns grain fields, grazing land, fences and old growth forest land adjacent to the Meyers'
property, all of which are potentially jeopardized by an adjoining fire hazard. As an
adjoining property owner, Hawkins falls within the class of citizens whose "substantial
property rights" were protected by the Ordinance. The potential fire hazard created by the
Commissioners' refusal to enforce their own ordinance has prejudiced Hawkins' substantial
property rights.

CONCLUSION
The degree of proof necessary to meet the threshold standing requirement is minimal
at best. In this case, Hawkins need only to show that he was in the class of persons for whose
benefit the Ordinance was adopted. The County has admitted the Ordinance was adopted to
facilitate and ensure access by tire protection and public safety personnel to residential
properties. It cannot be argued in good faith that this purpose is limited solely to protecting
the property owner upon whose property the fire originates. Hawkins, being an adjoining
land owner, is clearly within the class of persons for whose benefit BCZBO § 1-707 was
adopted and the County's refusal to enforce the frontage requirement most clearly affects his
substantial property rights.
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DATED this

1

day of March, 2009.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofIdaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by
facsimile, as indicated below, with the conect postage thereon, on this

1flt day of March,

2009.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTION
TO
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

ATTORNEY SERVED:
Blake G. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A.
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

( ,{Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Kipp L. Manwaring
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271

( --rirlail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
-vs.BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123

MINUTE ENTRY ON
MOTION HEARING

On March 9, 2009, at 10:30 AM, a Motion to Reconsider and a Motion for Attorney Fees
came on for hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open C0U11
at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Dale Storer and Mr. Dan Dansie appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. Blake Hall
appeared with the defendant.
Mr. Storer presented argument on the Motion to Reconsider.
Mr. Hall argued in rebuttal to the Motion to Reconsider.
Mr. Storer addressed the rebuttal argument.
Mr. Hall addressed the COUli on the matter of attorney fees.
After a brief discussion with the parties, the Court will issue a ruling on the matter after
reviewing the briefs.
MINUTE ENTRY - 1

Court was thus adjourned.

HINDURLING
c: Dale Storer
Blake Hall

MINUTE ENTRY - 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,

v.

Case No. CV-2007-6123
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER
ON PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER,
husband and wife,
Applicants.

This matter initially came before the court as a petition for judicial review of a decision
by the Bonneville County Commissioners granting Dale and Marla Meyer a variance to demolish
and replace two dilapidated houses with new, larger homes. This court entered a decision on
February 2, 2009, dismissing the petition. Petitioner now asks the court to reconsider its earlier
decision.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On
February 28, 2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning
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Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new
construction.
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 200 1, when the Meyers purchased the home
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 200 1 the Meyers have maintained the home but it
appears from testimony before the zoning commission that is has not been a year-round
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' propertyalso referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road.
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain.
The other parcel has a house referred to as the Jefson house that was built in 1910. The
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears
from the record that the Jefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a
new house on that parcel, as well.
The Jefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the Jefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the Jefson house
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road.
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The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet
of frontage on an established county road. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments voted
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming
historical use.

Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the Bonneville

County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a
county road.
Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision
and that matter was called up for hearing on December 1, 2008. On February 2, 2009 the court
issued a decision denying the petition because Petitioner did not meet the prejudiced substantial
rights requirement of I.C. § 67-5279 necessary to petition for judicial review.
Petitioner filed this motion to reconsider on February 5, 2009. Petitioner argues that the
court's previous decision failed to consider the effect Respondent's decision to allow the
construction has for increasing potential fire hazards on Petitioner's property. Following
responsive briefing, the matter came up for hearing on March 9, 2009. At the hearing, Petitioner
also argued that the court had erred in its original decision in determining that Petitioner failed to
meet the standard to petition required by I.C. § 67-5279.
At the time of the hearing the court had not yet received the parties' briefs, and the court
took the matter under advisement pending receipt of all briefs.
Having considered the motions, affidavits, exhibits, supp0l1ing legal memoranda and
oral arguments, the Court enters the following decision.
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II.
ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that the court's previous decision ignores the increased chance of fire
damage to Petitioner's property resulting from Respondent's decision, and that the court erred in
determining that Petitioner could not petition the court under I.C. § 67-5279. Respondent argues
that Petitioner's motion is inappropriate as this court considered the original petition as an
appellate body. Respondent also argues that Petitioner's argument is improperly raised and does
not support Petitioner's ability to petition this cOUli under I.C. § 67-5279.
Motion is Properly Before this Court

Respondent argues that Petitioner has improperly brought this motion under I.R.C.P.
11(a)(2)(B). Petitioner contends that the motion is properly before the court under I.A.R. 42.
I.A.R. 42 allows a party to file a petition for rehearing and requires briefing and allows
for oral argument. Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to comply with I.A.R. 42, in part
by initially refening to this motion as a motion to reconsider.
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "held that a motion to the district cOUli for
reconsideration of a decision rendered in its appellate capacity should be treated as a petition for
rehearing, an appropriate method to provide consistency in the appellate process." Dieziger v.
Pickering, 122 Idaho 718, 719 (Ct.App. 1992)(citing Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 219-20

(Ct.App. 1983)). In this situation, regardless of the procedural awkwardness occasionally arising
where a district court acts in an appellate role, this court agrees with Petitioner that this matter is
properly before the court as a petition to rehear. Following the Court of Appeals standard is
appropriate and allows this court to flexibly work within the rules while acting as an appellate
body.
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A motion for rehearing "is a request for a rehash of that which has already been decided;
only briefs, and oral argument, too, on occasion are allowed." Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 117
Idaho 790, 808 (1988).

Fire Hazard and Substantial Rights
Petitioner argues that this court's dismissal of his petition failed to consider the effect
Respondent's decision to allow the construction has of increasing potential fire hazards on
Petitioner's property. Petitioner also argues that the court erred in its interpretation of I.e. § 675279(4)'s requirement that "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced." Respondent argues that Petitioner improperly raises the fire
hazard argument for the first time on appeal, and that Petitioner's concerns about fire hazards do
not satisfy I.C. § 67-5279.
Petitioner argues that Respondent, by allowing the Meyers to replace their houses,
ignores BCZBO § 1-707 and creates a fire hazard on Petitioner's property. BCBZO § 1-707
requires that new homes have at least 100 feet of frontage on an established county road.
Petitioner also argues that this court ignored the increased risk of fire hazard on Petitioner's
property in issuing the original decision.
In issuing the original order, this court held that Petitioner's argument that the Meyers'
building of new houses on their property would increase traffic did not satisfy the requirements
ofl.C. § 67-5279 because it did not affect the Meyers' or Petitioner's existing rights to their land.
In reaching this decision, this court noted that "Petitioner offers no support for the notion that the
exercise of a pre-existing right can act to prejudice a substantial right." At oral argument in this
matter, Petitioner argued that the court mistakenly relied on an analysis of the Meyers' rights in
the property before the variance was granted. Petitioner urges the court to instead consider
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whether changes in the use of the Meyers' land could possibly negatively affect Petitioner's
property.
Petitioner relies on I.C. § 67-6521 of the Local Land Use Planning Act, which allows
affected parties to petition local land use agencies and to appeal their decisions pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act. An affected party is one "having an interest in real property
which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing the
development." I.e. § 67-6521(1)(a) Petitioner contends that because his land abuts the Myers'
property, he is an affected person and may appeal from Respondent's decision. However, the
LL UP A merely allows an affected party to "seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title
67, Idaho Code [the APA]," which includes I.C. § 67-5279. The provisions in § 67-6521 can in
no way be interpreted as offering relief through judicial review outside of the limitations found
in § 67-5279. The relief intended by the LLUPA is anticipated and delivered entirely within the
APA. This court reaffirms its original decision that Petitioner's claims raised in his petition for
judicial review are barred by I.e. § 67-5279 because they do not represent a prejudice to
Petitioner's substantial rights.
Respondent also argues that Petitioner's argument is not properly before the court,
claiming that Petitioner did not raise the fire hazard issue before the County Commissioners. A
review of the record of the Bonneville County Board of Adjustments' hearing and the appeal
before the County Commissioners supports the argument that Petitioner appears to have raised
the issue for the first time during the December 2008 hearing on Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Regardless, Petitioner's argument also fails under I.C. § 67-5279.
Petitioner argues that he has standing under the frontage requirement because he is in the
class of persons for whose benefit the ordinance was adopted. Any standing conferred by the
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ordinance could allow Petitioner to bring his concerns about the fire hazard before zoning
meetings and hearings before the County Commissioners, a right he appears not to have
exercised. However, this court is strictly limited in its review of agency actions by the APA, and
must affirm any agency action that does not prejudice a party's substantial rights. BCBZO § 1707 does not grant Petitioner additional substantive rights, nor does it provide this court with the
authority to evade the limitations ofI.C. § 67-5279.
Respondent's decision allowing the Meyers to build new homes does not change the
status quo. The Meyers currently have two dilapidated houses on the property that apparently do
not comply with the frontage requirement. Allowing the Meyers to replace those houses with two
new homes does not change in any form the rights of Petitioner to his property. As Petitioner
does not have substantial rights prejudiced by Respondent's decision, this court carmot disturb
Respondent's action as a state agency pursuant to the AP A.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's motion is DENIED.

ITISSO~ED.
Dated this

,

ay of June, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I hereby certify that on this
day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the
same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Attorneys for Petitioner
Dale W. Storer
Daniel C. Dansie
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Attorney for Respondent
Blake G. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

Attorney for Applicants
Kipp L. Manwaring
Just Law Office
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271
Ronald Longmore
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by
Deputy Clerk
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166)
dstorer@holdenlegal.com
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985)
ddansie@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P. O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Appellant, Stan Hawkins
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY,
STATE OF IDAHO
(!U 07-&1;2)
Case No. CV~9 1795

INRE:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family
Dwelling on Parcels Without the Required
100' of Road Frontage.
STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent-Respondent,
v.

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

141

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY BLAKE G. HALL AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, Stan Hawkins, appeals against the above

named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion, Decision, and Order on
Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review, dated February 2,2009, and the Opinion,
Decision, and Order on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 1,2009, both
of which were issued by the Hon. Jon J. Shindurling.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2).
3.

Appellant intends to assert the following issue on appeal: whether

Appellant has standing to pursue a Petition for Judicial Review of Respondent's decision
to grant Applicant's request for a variance to build homes on property adjacent to
Appellant's property.
4.

No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

Appellant requests that a reporter's transcript of the March 9, 2009, hearing

on the Motion for Reconsideration be included in the record. Appellant requests a hard
copy of the transcript.
6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.:
2

-
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a.

The entire record and transcript of the proceedings before the
Bonneville County Planning and Zoning Commission, as lodged
with the District Court.

b.

The entire record and transcript of the proceedings before
Respondent Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, as lodged
with the District Court.

c.

All decisions and orders of the District Court.

d.

All briefs filed in the District Court by Appellant and Respondent
including all electronic attachments thereto.

7.

Appellant requests that all documents, charts, maps, and photographs

attached to the items listed above be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify that:
a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court
reporter for the District Court of Bonneville County.

b.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee
for preparation of the reporters transcript.

c.

The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.

d.

The appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

3

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

14

DATED this

fD

day of July, 2009.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
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( -1'Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
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( ) Facsimile

Court Reporter for Judge Shindurling
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

( .,.--"') Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Facsimile

) Hand Delivery
) Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
-vs.BONNEVILLE CO. BOARD of
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123

MINUTE ENTRY

On July 14,2009, at 11:00 AM, a Motion for Attorney Fees came on for hearing before
the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy COUli Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Dan Dansie appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. Blake Hall appeared on behalf of
defendant.
Mr. Blake Hall presented argument on the Motion for Attorney Fees, and have amended
the motion for costs and fees, requesting the Court grant the amended motion.
Mr. Dansie argued in opposition to the Motion for costs and fees. Mr. Dansie argued that
the June 23 rd motion for costs and fees should be viewed as a new motion and denied as
untimely.
Mr. Hall rebutted the opposition argument.

MINllTE ENTRY - 1

After a brief discussion with the parties, the Court will review the motion and issue a
decision at a later date.
Court was thus adjourned.

SHINDURLING
c: Dale Storer

Blake Hall
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

INRE:

)

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling
on Parcels Without the Required 100' of
Road Frontage.

)
)
)
)
)

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner-Appellant

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123
Docket No.

)

v.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as Board of
Adjustment.
Respondent-Respondent
v.

DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
And wife,
Applicants.

Appeal from:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County

Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.
Case number from Court:

CV- 2007-6123

Order or Judgment appealed from: Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Review, dated 2-2-09, and Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration,
dated 6-1-09.
Attorney for Appellant:

Dale W. Storer

Attorney for Respondent:

Blake G. Hall

Appealed by:

Petitioner

Appealed against:

Respondent

Notice of Appeal Filed:

7-10-09

Appellate Fee Paid:

yes

Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes
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If so, name of reporter:
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Dated: July 20, 2009
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. CV-2007-6123

....

OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDE~~
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTI<UN FOliE
ATTORNEY'S FEES
-;::;:

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
v. DALE AND MARLA MEYER,
husband and wife,
Applicants.

1.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dale and Marla Meyer own several parcels of land off Bone Road in Idaho Falls. On
February 28, 2007, the Meyers went before the Bonneville County Planning and Zoning
Commission to request a variance to construct new homes on two of their parcels of land. The
parcels both currently have existing homes, which the Meyers seek to replace with new
construction.
One of the homes-referred to as the Rockwood house-was built in 1936. The
Rockwood house was last permanently occupied in 2001, when the Meyers purchased the home
from the daughter of the original owner. Since 2001 the Meyers have maintained the home but it
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appears from testimony before the zonmg commISSIOn that is has not been a year-round
residence since the Meyers acquired the home. The Rockwood home does not have direct
frontage on Bone Road and the Meyers rely on an easement traversing Stan Hawkins' propertyalso referred to as Spur Road--to reach the home from Bone Road.
The Rockwood house lies in the Canyon Creek flood plain and the Meyers want to tear it
down and build a new home on the property, out of the flood plain.
The other parcel has a house referred to as the lefson house that was built in 1910. The
Meyers have spent time and money modernizing the house, but have moved the home off of its
original stone foundation because a spring has developed on the side of the house. It appears
from the record that the lefson house has been unoccupied since 1999. The Meyers have
determined that further repairing the existing house is not cost-effective and they hope to build a
new house on that parcel, as well.
The lefson house sits behind the Bone Store, but at the time Mr. Meyer's father
purchased the house in 1954 the house apparently had frontage on Bone Road. The county
moved Bone Road in 1958, denying the lefson house of its frontage. Since 1958 the lefson house
has also relied on the easement for access to Bone Road.
The Meyers requested a variance from the requirement that homes have at least 100 feet
of frontage on an established county road. The Bonneville County Board of Adjustments voted
five to one to determine that a variance was not required because of the parcels' nonconforming
historical use.

Mr. Hawkins appealed the permit and on September 6, 2007 the Bonneville

County Commissioners adopted the board's decision. The County Commissioners also
determined that the Meyers never intended to abandon the land, and that the access road was a
county road.
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Mr. Hawkins filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the County Commissioners' decision
and that matter was called up for hearing on December 1, 2008.
In a February 2,2009 order, this court determined that Mr. Hawkins could not petition for
judicial review of the decision as his substantial rights were not prejudiced as required by I.C. §
67-5279(4). On February 5, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court
heard argument on the motion. The court denied Petitioner's motion in a June 1, 2009 order.
On February 10, 2009, Respondent filed a motion for attorney's fees. On July 14,2009,
the attorney's fees issue came up for hearing and the court took the matter under advisement.
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.e. § 12-117(1) provides, in patt:
[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
An award of attorney fees generally rests in the discretion of the court. Anderson v.
Ethington, 103 Idaho 658 (1982). However, I.e. § 12-117(1) is not discretionary; this court is
bound by the statute to award attorney's fees and costs when the losing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2005).
In determining whether to award attorney's fees, this court must first determine whether
the moving party prevailed in the action. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor,
145 Idaho 415 (2008). If the court determines that the patty requesting attorney's fees prevailed,
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the court must then determine whether the losing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. SEIZ Canst., L.L.C v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8 (2004).

III.
ANALYSIS

Respondent alleges that Petitioner appealed the Commission's decision without
reasonable basis in fact or law and that Respondent is therefore due reasonable costs and fees
under I.C. § 12-117. Petitioner argues that he sought judicial review based on debatable law;
Petitioner also argues that Respondent's motion for attorney's fees was untimely.
A. Respondent's Motion was Timely Filed

Petitioner contends that Respondent's motion was not timely filed. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5)
allows a party to submit a memorandum of costs, "but such memorandum of costs may not be
filed later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment." This court's order on Petitioner's
motion to reconsider was entered on June 1, 2009. Respondent did not file its motion for
attorney's fees until June 23, 2009, well after fourteen days had passed from the entry of
judgment.
Respondent argues that the proper date to consider for purposes of LR.C.P. 54 is not June
23,2009, but rather February 10,2009, the date when it filed its original motion for attorney's
fees, eight days after the original order in this case. Respondent contends that this motion, filed
in February, was timely filed under Rule 54(d)(5).
In the alternative, Respondent urges this court to consider the February motion for fees
prematurely filed. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that "[a] memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall
be considered as timely." This change to Rule 54(d)(5) formalized the holding in Crowley v.
Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 822-23 (1984). In Crowley, the Idaho Supreme Court
held "that the premature filing of the memorandum of costs in this case does not constitute a
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ground for striking the memorandum of costs" because the court could "conceive of no prejudice
to any party which would result from considering a memorandum of costs filed prior to a
decision of the court." ld. at 823.

Similarly, here, this court can think of no prejudice to

Petitioner resulting from considering Respondent's motion filed and answered to in February.
Additionally, in Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105
Idaho 873, 875 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the time periods under Rule 54 may
be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court (citing Wheeler v. Mclntyre, 100 Idaho 286
(1979».
Under any standard contemplated by the Idaho Rules or the Idaho Supreme Court,
Respondent's motion for attorney's fees was timely filed and is properly before this court.
B. Respondent was the Prevailing Party

Petitioner urges the court to reject Respondent's petition on the grounds that there was no
prevailing party in this case. This court did not directly consider the county commissioners'
decision, but instead held that

I.e. 67-5279(4) did not allow Petitioner the ability to

seekjudicial

review as "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced" and Petitioner could point to no substantial rights affected by the commissioners'
decision. Petitioner contends that this COUlt dismissed the petition for judicial review on
jurisdictional grounds, and therefore there is no prevailing party.
To support this argument, Petitioner relies on an Idaho Supreme Court opinion that has
since been withdrawn, Burns Holdings, LLC v. A1adison County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 2009
WL 1163405 (May 1,2009, July 9, 2009)(Opinion Amended and Superseded by Burns Holdings,
LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County C01lll1l'rS, 2009 WL 1959498 (Idaho Jul 09, 2009). In
Burns Holdings, the COUli ultimately upheld a district court's determination that, where it lacked
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jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the county commission's amendment of a comprehensive plan,
there was no prevailing party.
Here, unlike in Burns Holdings, this court has jurisdiction to review decisions made by
the county commissioners regarding the granting of variances under the Local Land Use
PlaIming Act. This court determined that, although Respondent fit the criteria of an affected
party under the LLUPA in I.C. §67-6521(a), he did not meet the requirement of the APA in I.C.
67-5279(4) that his substantial rights be prejudiced. This court has jurisdiction to hear the
petition; the deficiency lay in Petitioner's appeal under the requirements of the AP A, not the
nature ofthe commissioners' decision. The Burns Holdings opinion is inapplicable to this case.
Respondent prevailed in this matter.
C. Petitioner Acted with a Reasonable Basis

Respondent argues that Petitioner filed his petition for judicial reView without a
reasonable basis in law or fact. Petitioner argues that this case involved a good-faith argument
on issues of first impression in Idaho and therefore costs are inappropriate.
This cOlui's decision relied primarily on I. C. 67 -5279(4), which reqUIres that,
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be
affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." This court determined
that the commissioners' decision to allow construction on property accessible only by crossing
an existing easement across Petitioner's land did not prejudice Petitioner's substantial rights.
The parties did not provide-nor could this court find-an appellate decision defining a violation
of substantial rights in an applicable situation.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that "A party is not entitled to
attorney's fees if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of
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Sun Valley, 45 Idaho 87, 91 (2007)(citing Sh.I Z Canst., L.L.C v. Idaho State University, 140
Idaho 8, 14, (2004)). Respondent may argue that there are many Idaho cases construing the
"substantial rights" requirement, and that this issue is not one of first impression. Though this
court simply applied the plain meaning of the statue requiring the prejudicing of substantial
rights, there are no appellate cases construing the statute in a similar situation.
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to grant attorney's fees in cases where
the losing paliy "raised legitimate issues" in cases dealing with well-settled law. Cantwell v. City
of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 131 (2008).

Here, Petitioner raised legitimate issues concerning

Respondent's decision to allow his neighbors to construct buildings on lots that he believed did
not meet zoning requirements. Petitioner clearly met the "affected persons" requirement of the
LLUPA, but this court could not provide any remedy under the APA and therefore dismissed his
petition.
Petitioner' s appeal, while ultimately failing to state a violation of his substantial rights,
presented a legitimate issue to this court and was not fri volous or unreasonable.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

-f

day of August, 2009.
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Blake G. Hall
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630
Attorney for Applicants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN RE:

Case No. CV-09-1736
Docket No. 36742-2009

Application for a Variance to Validate the
Right to Replace a Single Family Dwelling on
Parcels Without the Required 100' of Road
Frontage.

MOTION TO USE DIGITAL CLERK'S
RECORD

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner - Appellant
\'.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as a Board
of Adjustment.
Respondent -Respondent,

DALE i\ND MARLA MEYER, husband and

Applicants.

Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review. dated February 2,
2009, and the Opinion, Decision, and Order on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. dated
June L 2009
Honorable Judge Jon J. Shindurling, Presiding District Judge
Dale W. Storer, ISB #2166
Daniel C. Dansie, ISB #7985
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Phone: (208) 523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518

(Attorneysfor Respondent)
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Pursuant to I.A.R. 32, the Petitioner-Appellant, Stan Hawkins, moves the Comi for
permission to file a portion of the Clerk's Record using as media, a CD-ROM containing "pdf'
COpIes of most of the record filed with the District Court. A copy of such CD-ROM as filed with
the District Court, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
This Motion is made for the reason that the record is very voluminous and is comprised of
approximate 1y four hundred seventy-five (475) pages ohvritten documents. The documents on the
CD-ROM are comprised of the Bonneville County Zoning and Building Ordinance and the record
of the proceedings before the BOlmeville County PImming and Zoning Commission and the Board
of Commissioners for Bon11eville County.
By submitting the Clerk's Record in CD-ROM format, significant copying expense can be

3yoided and the filing of the Clerk's Record can also be expedited.
DATED this

-1J$

day of September, 2009.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c.

CERTIFICATE OF UNCONTESTED MOTION
The undersigned does hereby certify that he has contacted opposing counsel and is authorized
to represent that opposing counsel has no obiection to this Motion.

1;

DATED and certified this

d?S-

day of September, 2009.

Dale W. Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c.
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.At

below, with the correct postage thereon, on this
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~

day of September, 2009.
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Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
605 N CAPITAL A VENUE
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STAN HAWKINS v. BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Bonneville County District Court #2007-6123
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE'
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEV.iLUE . -

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent/Respondent,
vs.
DALE AND MARLA MEYERS, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Bonneville

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123
Docket No. 36742

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF
EXHIBITS

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District COUli ofthe Seventh Judicial District ofthe State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in it's
determination:
Agency Record
Agency Transcript of February 28,2007 Hearing
Agency Transcript of April 25, 2007 Hearing
Agency Transcript of May 23, 2007 Hearing
Agency Transcript of September 6, 2007 Hearing
CD Rom, Appendices to Petitioner's Brief, filed September 15,2008
Transcript of March 9, 2009 Hearing, filed August 31,2009
And I further celiify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are paIi of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 1

1.62

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this

day of December, 2009.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAJIiISTRiCT OF fHE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
And
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123
Docket No. 36742

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is
a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required
under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-l
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District
Court this

day of December, 2009.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B6N~EvILtm

STAN HAWKINS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, acting as Board of
Adjustment,
Respondent,
And
DALE AND MARLA MEYER, husband
and wife,
Applicants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-6123
Docket No. 36742

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

----------------------------~)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of December, 2009, I served a copy of the Reporter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Couli in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:
Dale W. Storer
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

Scott R. Hall
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

Kipp L. Manwaring
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0271

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.
RONALD LONGMORE

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE - 1
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